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The German Paradox 1
( A Problem in National Character)
ROBERT F. SPENCER 2
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis
ABSTRACT - There has been considerable argument since World War II over whether the concept
of a national character, such as might distinguish the Germans, the Japanese, the Russians, or any
other contemporary national group, has any reality in fact. The present paper, operating on the
assumption that there is a distinctive German character, one essentially different from that of the
English, the Italians, the French, or the Russians, seeks to show, in terms of the processes of culture
defined by anthropology, where German uniqueness lies. This, it is contended, rests not so much
in factors of native psychology and social organization as it does in geographic position and in
the German position in the stream of European history. The marginal position of the Germans,
both in time and space, is a vital element in producing both excellence and excess.

On Defining Germany

In 1789, Immanuel Kant surveyed his fellow Germans
from his ivory tower in the little East Prussian city of
Konigsberg. His analysis was surprisingly felicitous, especially, be it remembered, since he was speaking of the
behavior characteristics of citizens of a congeries of
states - some major, some petty, but each an ostensible
nation - and not of a single nationality. The German, he
said, is honest and home loving, traits that make for
phlegm instead of brilliance; he is industrious, saving,
and cleanly; he possesses few of those qualities of alertness that make for genius; and he is persistent in both
his reasoning and endurance. Able- and intelligent, he
lacks, nevertheless, sharpness of wit and refinement of
taste. Among all civilized peoples, Kant noted, it is the
German who becomes most docile under government. He
fashions an elaborate hierarchy of rank and title, according more worth to these factors that promote a class
structuring of society and a total absence of egalitarianism, than to natural ability. Further lacking confidence
in his own abilities, he becomes imitative and methodical,
fears to take an original step, and thus becomes pedantic
(Kant. 1869:246-249).
Since 1789, the German nation has come into being;
it has undergone the vicissitudes of empire, republic, and
dictatorship, only to be torn asunder again in our own
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day. Yet, despite the recently developed and essentially
ephemeral national unity of Germany, despite localisms
in custom and language - factors promoting regional
particularism - Kant's characterization of his German
countrymen seems as valid today as it did in that fateful
year now nearly two centuries ago. These have been centuries of change and ferment in world history; centuries
that have been roiled by the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Era and the Industrial Revolution. During this
turbulence Germany coalesced into a single nation and
reached its peak under Bismarck. If Bismarck's imperialism terminated with World War I, it was followed by the
grosser imperialism of Hitler and the German disaster
after World War II. Despite these vagaries of history,
however, the German national character seems to have
remained constant. Kant's adjectives seem still to be applicable and it seems evident that the actions and patterns that he described could never be applied to other
Europeans.
The method that Kant employed to elicit his national
type or characters - remembering that his interests extended beyond the German states and that he considered
other Europeans as well - is hardly one that a contemporary social scientist could regard as valid. Kant's
concept of an ethnic "soul," or "genius," that is at once
both biological and historical, lays overmuch stress on
intuitive judgment. Yet it is remarkable that even if a
somewhat more detached and ostensibly objective methodology of analysis is employed, the results are not materially different from those to which Kant's intuitive
reasoning led him, suggesting that essentially the same
conclusions can be reached by other paths. Nevertheless,
a somewhat more verifiable method and its applications
are required.
It is necessary, first, to make one or two assumptions.
It must be agreed, for example, that there is such a thing
as a national character. At once, however, a problem
arises since different levels must be considered. Western
civilization offers a series of artifacts, beliefs, and points
of view that can be quite sharply differentiated from
those of other major areas of human development, such
as China or India. And, of course, the Germans - like
the Britons, French, Russians, Americans, and many
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others - share in the common understandings of Western
man. Hence, the point at which the German becomes
differentiated from other participants in Western civilization is, paradoxically, also the point at which he begins to be similar. If, as Kant says, the German is to be
characterized as pedantic, pedantry is by no means absent in the behavior of the English or French. If it be
said that the German emphasis on social title obscures
and minimizes individual growth and freedom of expression, a fixed social-class system can equally well be described for Italy, France, or Britain. Do such common
points invalidate any appraisal of national character,
German or otherwise? Some students of the problem argue in the affirmative. On the other hand, all experience
does seem to point to the fact that there is a uniqueness
in national behavior patterns, and that, however, much
national enclaves may share in a totality of common tradition they hold in common local emphases and localized phrasings, and alignments of ideas and concepts.
A second assumption, equally important, holds national character to be an historical product. In this sense,
history is to be understood as broadly comprehending
both natural environment and geographical position as
well as the totality of sociocultural development in time.
A corollary to this assumption is that sociocultural development, whether German or any other, is a direct
result of a process of learning. The point is an important
one as it shifts the emphasis away from genetic or racial
factors. Thus, when the Germans are considered, their
ethos or "soul" must be viewed as based on a series of
acquired understandings and not as innate. The Germans
have been fightiQg aggressive wars with each other and
others around them since the days of Caesar and Tacitus,
and very likely before that. Does this mean that the Germans possess a genetically determined aggressive drive,
that the Nazi movement is comprehensible only in terms
of a vicious racial character? If this be true, theIJi obviously there is no living with the Germans in the modern
world and surely no purpose in assisting and encouraging
German rearmament. The aggressive pattern, however,
does not appear among Germans who adapt themselves
to other environments. They, like other immigrants to
new social settings - better than most, in fact - adjust
readily to new coqditions. This is not to rule out certain
kinds of genetic factors that may operate in segments of
the German population, but to realize that the Germans,
as is equally true of other Europeans living as national
entities, are made up of many and diverse ethnic strains.
Kant's racial soul can be questioned as well as national
culture, such as the Germans seem to possess, for culture
is never to be identified with race.
But if it is recognized that there is a German national
charactel'. and that it is the product of its history, there
is a tendency merely to type German behavior, or that
of any natfonal group, much in the way that Kant has
done, and, thus, to fail to grasp the dynamic relation
between history and culture. To type behavior, however
such behavior may be derived, permits a statement that,
on the surface, may be very interesting, but is this not
merely a shorthand resolution of a problem that has far
Journal of, Volume Thirty-twp, No. 3, 1965

greater dimensions? Even when the influence of history
is considered, it seems legitimate to ask whether German
national character is a result of historical accidents or
whether the historical events themselves were brought
about by actions and behavior that are peculiarly German. The question is not an idle one, nor is its answer
so difficult of resolution as may appear at first glance,
but it must be considered on differing levels of abstraction. To confuse history and psychology, society and culture, leads to the kinds of national characterizations that
seem at best superficial. With these reservations, and
still assuming that there is a German national culture,
the problem arises of how it can best be delimited. In
other words, who and what are the Germans?
A possible approach is to consider, first, what the
Germans are not. This· is admittedly troublesome, leading as it does to the syllogistic reasoniqg that Germans
are Germans because they are not Poles. Somewhat more
positively, and taking a cue from the anthropologist's
experience with nonliterate peoples, a possible basis for
ethnic definition can lie in language. Are Germans, then,
those who speak German as a mother-tongue? Several
problems arise at once. The German speech community
does, of course, cross several international boundaries
and would include not only the Austrians and the German-Swiss but also the German-speaking populations of
such areas as Czechoslovakia and Poland. While the latter play a rather prominent role in recent German history, it is certainly clear that the Swiss, especially, but
the Austrians, as well, despite some sense of linguistic
identification, have pretty generally tended to shy away
from pan-Germanism. Even within the vague national
boundaries of Germany itself, the speech community is
defined with difficulty because of several different levels
of linguistic development and usage. Wh\m one dialect
out of the many that can be listed in Germany begins to
be so separated from its neighbors that it calls forth
recognition as a distinct local language, linguistic uniformity is lost indeed. Dialect and local language are
sharply set off from standard High German, the literary
tongue (Lowie, 1945:4-13; and Lowie, 1954:5-15).
It is generally agreed that Luther's translation of the
Bible set the tone for a conventional High German or
Schriftdeutsch. But literary German, however, much it
may reflect a classic spirit, is by no means the language
of the folk. That there is today a somewhat more unified
German language as a result of greater uniformity of
education and the wider opportunity for communication
afforded by press and radio, is probably true. This does
not, however, erase the import of such separate languages
as the North German Plattdeutsch or the Schwytzertiitsch
of German Switzerland, both independent literary languages, and it does not obscure the homely character of
many local dialectic forms, both urban and rural, not
excluding the Viennese or Berliner "cockney." Even the
Schriftdeutsch has its local peculiarities. There is as much
difference between the cultivated High German of North
Germany and that of Austria as there is between British
and American-English standards. Lowie, in his studies,
points out that although Luther's choice of the official
161

language of the electorate of Saxony paved the way for a
standardized High German, there were five major literary languages in the Holy Roman Empire of the day
( Lowie, 1945: 8-9) . In the nineteenth century, localisms
in speech tended to support a regional nationalism with
the result that even scholars sneered at each other's versions of High German (Lowie, 1945: 11). Again, in the
twentieth century, Hitler's lack of linguistic elegance
caused many cultured Germans to snicker. The language
picture of Germany clearly offers nothing consistent. The
classic Greek and Latin influences that developed in the
German version of the Renaissance, coupled with the
slavish copying of things French at the time of Frederick
the Great, have only added to the German confusion of
tongues. The patriotic Arndt is definitely wrong when he
attempts to define his fatherland on the basis of language. 3
But if it is recognized that the Germans cannot be
identified as a racial group by a common language, what
remains? If the Germans are not Poles, Frenchmen, or
Italians, there is the suggestion of a political criterion.
Some have held this to apply, but without coming to
grips with the historic process as such. This is to say,
in effect, that although Germany is made up of many
political unjts that have existed both now and in the past,
there is still a sufficient community of spirit that permits
a resolution of the Germans as against other national
groups. But this, too, it must be admitted, is wholly
vague. After the period of the Germanic tribes and the
V olkerwanderungen, after the time of the feudal baronies
of the Dark Ages, there arose, not without uneasy travail, the holy Roman Empire. (One may echo Voltaire's
contemptuous epigram that it was n,either holy, nor Roman, nor yet an empire.) Despite the many petty principalities making up the socalled Empire, the German
states developed something of a tradition of unity, however tenuous. Is it possible, then, to regard the German
character and nation as stemming from the historical fact
of empire? .'Clearly not since, on the face of it, the Holy
Roman Empire remained a fiction, demanding no patriotic allegiance of its citizens. Just as in the case of the
local language loyalties, so also with the body politic:
there was identification with town, guild or parish, district, state, or province, but the nationalistic values and
privileges of citizenship in Imperial Rome never carried
over to its latter-day descendant.
One need consider only the somewhat more recent
history of Germany to note the absence of a concerted
drive toward unity. Bismarck had the task of upsetting
an enforced separation that was convenient and congenial to the conquering French under Napoleon I. Although there was a brief flurry of emergent political nationalism in the Napoleonic period it was short-lived.
3

Quoted by Lowie (1954: 8)
So weit die deutsche Zunge klingt
Und Gott in Himmel Lieder singt;
Das soll es sein!
Das, wackrer Deutscher, nenne Dein!
(Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland? 1813,
by Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769-1860))
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Bismarck's success appears to have depended on his
methods of "blood and iron" and suggest a nationalism
imposed from the top down and lacking popular spontaneity (Reuss, 1957). Similarly, it required the imposed
racist theories of Hitler and the Nazis to break down the
barriers of locality, class, and group. The Nazis created
unity negatively, by force it is true, but also by means of
scapegoat techniques. The permissible conclusion seems
to be that a historical basis does not exist for German
unity and, certainly, there is no deeply rooted sense of
national identity. The two Germanies of today, a free
federal union in the west, a communist-dominated totalitarian union in the east, need occasion no surprise.
Both, as federal states, offer a reflection of a continuing
concern with local autonomy and provincialism.
·The absence of political unity is offset by the common
stereotype of the German whose fervent love for fatherland is all but proverbial. And, indeed, the rather maudlin sentiments expressed in such a poem as Arndt's suggest a strong preoccupation with patriotic nationalism.
But one is obliged to question German patriotism. Kant
made a special point of the fact that the German lacked
a passionate attachment to his homeland. This is why,
he said, the German emigrates so readily, adjusts to conditions in alien lands, and, in fact, wins praise because of
his solid qualities of thrift, order, and cleanliness. Actually, despite the many (and rather minor) poets of the
nineteenth century, especially those who held themselves
to be spokesmen for a German nationalism - praising at
length the stolid German virtues - one is never sure
whether the Prussian poet means to include Bavaria in his
German fatherland or whether the Westphalian is really
thinking of his Hessian neighbor. The idea and ideal of a
whole Germany, a national state evoking deep emotional
associations, is, thus, not only late in developing but often
forced. The result is that patriotic and nationalistic zeal
lacks depth and quality; when it is expressed, it seems to
strike a false note. In this, as in so many other aspects
of their behavior, the Germans become extreme and their
overt expressions of the nationalistic ideal, however put
forth, reach rather ludicrous heights of ecstatic and cloying sentimentality. Actually, patriotism among the Germans is a phenomenon associated not with land and the
institutions serving to weld the land together in formal
ways, such as governmental authority, or the symbol of
flag, but, rather, with a view of self and egotistic morality. As will be seen, the German view of Kultur and its
implied moral superiority is far more fundamental than
the patria idea of Britain and the United States.
If the concept of the German national state possesses
a degree of mediocrity, it is, on the other hand, the great
German poet who far transcends it and is indifferent to
German destiny apart from humanity. The cosmopolitan
figure, the vigorous and outstanding creator in the German arts, is a German paradox. Indifferent to Kultur, he
nevertheless fosters and makes it. Heine's idealism and
insight led him to despair of a German fatherland, while
Schiller and, especially, Klopstock, although influenced
in their writings by a sense of German history, tradition
and destiny, emerge as pan-humanists, not as German
The Minnesota Academy of Science

patriots. Goethe, in turn, was rejecte9 by the Nazis precisely because of his indifference to things pa_n-German.
Historically and conceptually, there is virtually no German state and surely, no tenable definition of Germany
in nationalism or patriotism.
Thus, Germany, whether through the eyes of the outsider, or the Germans themselves, becomes increasingly
difficult to pinpoint. It is particularism, not nationalism,
or national unity, that characterizes the Germans. Local
interest and association pit north against south, east
against west. It makes the Bavarian, with his particular
idiom, identify _with Munich, the Brandenburger with
Berlin, and the Austrian with Vienna. It sets off a city
such as Hamburg, still taking pride in its ancient Hanseatic heritage, and holds it aloof from intraGerman entanglements so that its association with Prussian Empire
and Third Reich is most reluctant. Until the Industrial
Revolution - a process of change that entered Germany
relatively late - and its accelerated pace and tempo of
life, the German town and countryside retained something of its mediaeval color. The peasantry of the predominantly rural landscape retained its folk patterns.
Not only localisms in speech but, far more, those in custom, religious festival, costume, house construction, and
farm and village arrangement, suggest confusion and the
total absence of a consistent pattern. Nor, despite modern complex lines of communication, have local loyalties
and usages given way; on the contrary, one sees again,
here and there, the distinctive regional peasant dress. It
would not be surprising to see local customs again emerging along with local dialect.
·
Lowie, in his appraisals of the Germans, was so struck
by these particularistic German developments that he
found great difficulty in delimiting the total German
sphere. His was essentially a sociological interpretation
that permitted the analysis of particular aspects of social
organization, such as social classes, urban, and rural developments, and familial arrangements: all of which show
some uniqueness that might be defined as distinctively
German. The difficulty arises, however, when sections of
Germany are compared with each other; as much difference in overt organization and structure may be seen
then as exists between the British and French, or the
Germans and Italians, taken at large. Lowie suggested
the possibility of eliciting one or two dominant themes
in the total entity of things Germany. If Western civilizaJion and all that the phrase implies is a continuum, Ger- many has a special place on it, but one that shades
off gradually into that of neighboring peoples (Lowie,
1954:354-356). Granted that the distinctive German
phrasing of Western civilization is discernible from that
of Britain, France, Russia, or any other Western nation,
the question still remains of how this special German
development is made manifest and definable.
When attention is focused on German social structure
and its associated behavior, it can be seen that distinctive
attributes of the German character are observable in both
the kinds of social forms that the Germans have fashioned and the ways in which Germans respond to their
social institutions. These characteristic German organizaJournal of, Volume Thirty-two, No. 3, 1965

tions and behavior can yet be regarded from another
perspective: defining the whole of Germany as a culture,
one that exhibits a series of consistent and predictable
patterns despite local and particularistic phrasings. Thus,
it is possible to step behind the overt phenomena, behind
the elements that make up the external structure and the
associated observable ways of acting and behaving,_ and
reach the postulates and premises underlying the culture
and the historical causes of them.
·
But, again, it is necessary to make certain reservations. At the present time there is a vast number - a
plethora indeed - of attempts to evaluate German national character. Many amount to no more than shorthand psychologizing to explain historical events. Germany has become a favorite target for such approaches,
particularly since the Nazi excesses so appalled the
world. The psychologizing of history can be noted, for
example, in the person of Martin Luther who has been
held by many to represent a prime ·case study of the
"authoritarian personality" (Fromm, 1941 :40-102).
From this, it is argued that there is a basis for understanding the pattern of dominance-submission relationship that is applicable both to Lutheran theology and
German society. Reserving this point for a moment,
suffice it to say that psychology, whether individual or
social, does not quite hold the dynamic explanation of
social behavior in national terms. A criticism can be
made precisely because, given a distinctive feature such
as the authoritarian institutions that some societies have
evolved, the institutions will function differently in different settings. If one can discuss the authoritarianism
that operates within the characteristic institutions of German society and culture, it is obvious that one is not
discussing the same kind of authoritarianism that was
found in Japan or clJiaracterizes contemporary Egypt or
Spain. This is not to deny the place of authoritarian character or personality in the German setting, but to recognize that it occurs among Germans in a pattern peculiar
to Germans. A German personality, assuming that such
a construct can be formulated, reflects a distinctive and
idiosyncratic way of behaving that, in turn, is resident in
the special kinds of definitions, premises, and understandings that mark German culture. Culture is not
psychology and must be perceived differently.
By the same token, neither the German national character nor that of other nations can be explained in terms
of events. Any culture is an historic product but is not
the result of specific events. It is, rather, engendered by
historic process. Nor can historic process be evaluated
in wholly mechanistic terms. A view of manifest destiny,
holding, in effect, that the seeds of Nazism were sown
when the first Germans wandered into Bavaria and the
Rhineland, or that in Martin Luther is born Adolf Hitler,
cannot be cavalierly dismissed. One may incline to agree
with Spengler that had Goethe died young, the spirit of
Faust and Tasso would still have been present, even if-to
materialize in another form. But, on the other hand,
such a view fails to recognize that history, like natural
environment, imposes limits only to a degree. There is
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latitude within the framework that history creates; the
event itself can redirect the process.
The point is worth making, especially since, in modern
terms, so much explanatory analysis has been dependent
on interpretations of historical happenings themselves.
The Treaty of Versailles undoubtedly created a situation
in which an especially heavy blow was dealt to German
hopes and in which, for the moment at least, a nascent
imperialist spirit was crushed. There is no questioning
the fact that the wrecking of Germany following the
Treaty paved the way for some kind of resurgence. Versailles explains defeat, punishment, economic upheaval,
and momentary societal disorganization; it does not explain why the Germans possessed sufficient toughness to
rise again within a few short years. Nor can it offer a
clue to the understanding of the peculiar patterning of
aggression that Nazi Germany fostered. Twice within a
generation the Germans have gone down to abysmal defeat. Yet each time they have come back. A nation or
culture with a different kind of organization than the
German might have shown continued dispirited disorganization. Why Germany should possess its remarkable
resilience, why it should be able to rise phoenix-like
from its defeats, are questions that call for historical explanations in the broadest sense, interpretations in the
light of the broadest cultural analysis.
With all the foregoing reservations, one comes at last
to a definition of the Germans. History and psychology
and, particularly, depth psychology, as it has been applied so widely in recent years to the concept of national
character, have their important places, but, like the historic conditions of economic, political, or social events,
or, indeed, like social institutions themselves, they should
not be confused with the cultural fabric in which the
events occur. Although an approach to national character
is necessarily eclectic, its roots lie in a concept of national culture.
The Germans can thus be regarded as those Europeans who possess a specialized and particularized
set of fundamental points of view and values that,
interacting with a process of history, set them off
from other groups in the community of Euro-American civilization.
Germany's Marginal Culture - The Time is
Out of Joint
If the problem of the German paradox can be resolved
primarily on the basis of an understanding of the processes of cultural history, culture as such is to be understood in two related and yet somewhat different perspectives: on the one hand, a culture is a product of its
history; more than this, a culture represents a specific
kind of organization, a total constellation that is made
up of elements-both material and nonmaterial-brought
together in special ways and reflecting a distinctive alignment. Human behavior in culture mirrors this special
kind of integration. If the puzzle of Germany is to be
solved in cultural terms, one must look for causal factors in the culture-historic process and, at the same time,
find the effects of such processes in level of integration
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and in the peculiar and distinctive behaviors that the
Germans exhibit.
National character or, better, national culture, it is
agreed, exists as a related set of behavior patterns,
attitudes, and values that singularly identify that integrated ethnic whole commonly called a na'tion. Remembering that the concern here is not with the political state
as such but, rather, with a set of actions, beliefs, patterned ways of thinking and doing, it is possible to single
out the German entity and to recognize a set of common
understandings that, when given behavioral motion, are
distinctively German. To state the matter in a somewhat
different way, a German culture is resident in the characteristic series of premises or postulates - values in
short - that lies behind the behavior identified as German. German values are, of course, those of Western
civilization and are shared with other nations that participate in the total Western development, but the values
are shaped and given meaning by the peculiar accidents
of German history and the German geographical position and, further, are given reality in the action of the
German individual and the German group.
No German questions the fundamental premises of
Western civilization. Such concepts and values as those
relating to human dignity and perfectability, progress, or
the triumph of goodness over evil, are as much a part of
the German heritage as that of Britain, France, or the
United States. It is precisely here, in fact, that the nonGerman begins to balk, to view with amazement and even
horror the kinds of excesses of which the Germans seem
capable - behavior that seemingly represents a flagrant
rejection of the deeply rooted and commonly shared values of Western man. Nor does it seem that the problem
can be airily dismissed in rationalization. It is all very
well laboriously to explain that the Nazis were a criminal
and gangster element, that "good" Germans were really
unaware of Nazi aspirations and acts, or that the German
masses succumbed to false propaganda (Ropke, 1948:
7 4-78). This is rationalization, indeed, and fails to account for the display of an intense patterning of hostility
and hatred, the solid front of National Socialism, genocide, and war guilt. (This is not to point a moral finger,
nor even to denounce or condemn recent German acts.)
The Nazi state and World War II suggest a behavioral
excess that it is possible to find in other aspects of German life as well. National Socialism thus can be regarded not as a cause but as an effect of something resident in German culture (Kohn, 1949: 157-172). It begins to appear as though the basic values of Western
civilization are either rooted lightly in the Germans or are
skewed in such a way as to be incomprehensible to the
non-German.
How the Germans have given a slightly different
weighting to Western man's fundamental points of view
calls for some further comment. The Western ideal, for
example, permits a high degree of articulate expression in
the various forms of art. But, as the German arts are
examined, this ideal is seen to be hemmed in with qualities of brooding sullenness or touched with the brush of
incurable romanticism. Absent is the lighter touch and a
The Minnesota Academy of Science

certain dignity perhaps; there is also, however, a ponderous quality. Like Faust, the German hero assumes too
much; his very earnestness becomes oppressing to himself. Such evaluations are admittedly subjective but in
them one begins to discover the features that set off the
Germans from other national cultures in the total Western configuration. German culture begins to offer a series
of variations on the major theme of Western civilization.
A culture is a whole, an integrated totality of value
and belief, social structure and psychological elements,
worked on and shaped by the process of history. When
these total aspects of content and process are analyzed,
the German ethos begins to emerge as the result of some
specialized rephrasings of major leit-motifs characteristic
of the West.
An examination of Germany qua culture, embracing
both history and psychology, obviates a problem of some
contemporary importance. In the modern context of the
social sciences it is fashionable· to lay the burden of explaining national behavior at the door of national psychology. Lewis Mumford, for example, sees the roots of
Naziism in the "human soul" and states, "In overwhelming pride, delight in cruelty, neurotic disintegration - in
this and not in the Treaty of Versailles or in the incompetence of the German Republic lies the explanation of
Fascism" (Mumford, 1940: 118). The psychiatrist, Eric
Fromm, on the other hand, justly impatient with so
patently mystic a view, holds that Naziism is fundamentally a psychological problem, one that follows a particular psychological direction because of an interaction with
socio-economic factors (Fromm, 1941: 208). There is no
argument with the latter position save that one dimension
of importance is omitted: neither politics nor economics,
nor yet the peculiar features of German psychology however much these may indeed all interact - are wholly
comprehensible out of context from the totality of German culture.
The problem thus remains of defining these dimensions of German culture. Two elements necessary to such
a definition have been suggested. If it be regarded as
axiomatic that a culture is an historic product, it is also
held that a culture is a structured whole. The parts of
such a total entity, whatever they may be, whether material and technological, political, economic, or religious,
social or psychological, coalesce to form the whole structure. In this total sociocultural Gestalt they are interdependent. This definition, applied to Germany, as indeed
it may be to any human group, suggests the interdependence of all human activity withiIJ. a culture. There can
be no adequate understanding of German political institutions without reference to the German family; family
and state in turn relate to social class, to economic organization and to religious values. All such human institutions, in any culture, complement and balance one another in their interaction. Granted, however, that the
problem is first one of structure, of the series of interrelated parts, there is also the dimension of the distinctive
way in which the parts are assembled. This is the integration of the culture, the aspect that permits characteristic definition. This suggests that it is possible to elicit a
Journal of, Volume Thirty-two, No. 3, 1965

dominant chord, a leitmotif or primary expression, that
may be traced through every facet of a given culture.
How valid is such a concept? It is a familiar one, admittedly, resting as it does in the historical idealism of
Spengler and founded primarily in Nietzschean doctrines.
Further, it has found its way into contemporary social
scientific thought. 4 The authoritarianism of the Germans,
for example, which emerges as a dominant-submissive
relationship in so many contexts of observable German
behavior, is often held up as a kind of keystone of German social structure. One cannot deny that empirically,
authoritarian behavior among the Germans has been
pretty well demonstrated. But, conversely, the striving
German spirit and the progressive ideal, which are
couched particularly in the romantic framework, are also
significant attributes of the German character. There
need be no contradiction nor, in fact, is there any. The
individual who lives in the familiar framework of his culture, taking its orientations for granted and, indeed,
being unaware of them, is always confronted with an
imperfect structure and implicit contradiction. Western
man as a whole, in fact, although stressing such values
as human dignity and the worth of human life, still finds
little difficulty in accepting war as a solution to certain
kinds of problems. Culture is the entity in human life
and affairs that establishes a framework of the familiar
and permits the resolution of daily problems in acceptable and predictable ways.
This is not to suggest that culture is a static entity;
on the contrary, any culture and, particularly, one as
complex as Germany's, is constantly confronted with the
problem of reintegrating parts subjected to change. But
the changes that occur are in line with existing patterns
of internal arrangement. In respect to Germany or, indeed, any culture, the ways in which total sociocultural
integration is achieved and the level of integration - i.e.,
whether the organization is tightly knit or loosely connected and mobile, or whether there is receptivity to new
ideas - become a hallmark permitting specific identification (Steward, 1951). As the many human cultures are
reviewed, it is evident that some are put together more
effectively than others or, to put the matter more technically in language suggested above, there are differing
levels o( integration. German culture is made up of parts
that do not seem to dovetail as well or completely as do
other European units, especially, Britain and France;
and, considering Europe as a temporal continuum, Germany makes a poor second to Renaissance Italy or the
Spain of Charles V, in both of which a kind of integrative peak was reached. The question arises - what has
happened in the case of the Germans to make this so?
The problem can be resolved historically by directing
our attention to those special developments that, taken
together, produce the flavor or climate of the existing
cultural entity. What is implied here is an effiorescencei.e., a specialized cultural growth- occurring in a point
in time. It seems evident, from the lesson of history, that
• The concept is variously expressed in the work of A. R.
Radcliffe-Brown and his followers, in Malinowski's ideas on
functionalism, and in the work of Talcott Parsons and others.
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when one· facet of a culture spurts or expands, others
follow suit, reSulting in a sudden and intensive total
growth. This holds especially for the development of new
ideas ana' inventions, a:nd is a reflection of a cultural climate in which appear new wealth and geographic expansion, and developments in art and thought, science, and
the appearance of a highly stable social order. Added to
this may be a high degree of individual participation in
the country's development, as well as an expanded opportunity to share in the benefits of the total culture and,
indeed, of human freedom. Those cultures that follow
such a course of integrated expansion leave a mark on
the pages of human history and, by virtue of their contributions, become centers of civilization. They are many,
and it is n,ecessary only to recall Periclean Athens, Han,
China, or Elizabethan England to obtain a perspective.
Why such growths should take place need not be examined at length. The ancient river systems of the Tigris,
the Nile, the Chinese Hoang Ho, or the Indus-Ganges in
India, were crossroads where many peoples bearing
many ideas came together and were stimulated to develop
their ideas. If the Roman Empire represented a shift of
culture to Italy, in the ancient world, it created in the
Augustan age, at least, a period in which the ideologies
of many peoples were given free exchange and expression. It is a principle of culture history that when exchange ceases and is replaced by isolation, cultural stagnation occurs. So it was in Europe in the Dark Ages. Not
until the Crusades did Europe return to its heritage of
civilization when Hellenism was rediscovered through the
rich culture of the Arabs. As a result of interactions with
latter-day Byzantium, the rise of the Italian Renaissance
was promoted.
But where such crossroad situations have not existed,
where cultures have grown in essential isolation, the kind
of climactic development that characterizes a culture
center does not take place. Here are the marginal cultures, less inclined to invent and more prone to borrow
the ideas and inventions of others. Also, characteristic is
the absence of well integrated unity. This means that the
marginal culture, although able to refine and improve,
and to achieve heights of greatness in one or another
area, so fails to keep its· other facets in balance that an
impression of distortion is conveyed. Such marginality is,
in part,· a function of geography, in that the marginal
culture is usually located away from a crossroads center.
A result of such historical and geographical marginality
may be discerned in cultural behavior that reflects a
marked sense of insecurity and uncertainty. The marginal
culture, uninventive itself, is a receiver rather than a giver
of ideas and, consequently, frequently finds itself in a
dilemma. By nature conservative, it is indifferent to innovation, rigid in its social structure and, indeed, often
puritanical "in defense of its own institutions; thus, it is
often confronted with wholesale change as influences
reach it from more stable central cultures. The result,
when conservatism and change war with each other, may
be revolution.
The classic example of the marginal culture is unquestionably Japan, both in its modern dependence on the
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West and in its ancient and medieval relations to China.
Located as it is on the edge of Asia, Japan was able to
borrow selectively from the Chinese culture center. In
modern times, the Japanese chose to follow the example
of the West, resulting in a curious hodge-podge, composed
of Chinese elements, Western technology, and yet a distinctive Japanese spirit. For, although the growth and
development of Japan's culture are dependent on the diffusion of culture elements from abroad, the Japanese
nation is an entity in itself and possesses its own characteristic flavor. The Japanese have made of traits that they
have borrowed something peculiarly their own. Thus, the
Japanese took over the Chinese system of writing but
adapted it to their own linguistic needs by the invention
of a secondary syllabic script. They adopted Chinese
Buddhism but related it to their own ancestral cult and
their own version of the patriarchal. family. Japan refined to an extreme such basic Chinese ideas as drama,
architecture, the tea ceremonial, and painting. Although
they modified by diffusion the cultural elements that
reached them, they could also afford to be selective. The
Chinese system of bureaucracy and the Confucian ideal
of the state could not be adjusted to existing Japanese
social institutions. Similarly, in taking over ideas from
the West, the Japanese improve and refine but, again,
do not invent. They become scientific specialists and
high-grade technicians yet contribute almost nothing to
science as such. They avidly read Chu Hsi and Wang
Yang-ming, Bodhidharma, Descartes and Schopenhauer,
but they are not philosophers. From the example of J apan, it can be seen that the development of marginal cultures proceeds in spurts as it borrows or rejects elements
from the more effectively integrated culture centers. The
marginal cultural controls its own destiny but does little
to further it.
Germany, in relation to the total history of Europe and
that of Western civilization at large, is such a marginal
culture. The concept of greatness, while admittedly subjective, permits evaluation in the sense of an ultimate,
whether of form or idea. Germany has unquestionably
produced greatness in many aspects of its development in developing new forms and concepts - but it is characterized, on the whole, by a lack of inventiveness. Not,
of course, that the Germans reach the same marginal
extremes as the Japanese - their geographical position
precludes this - but in a general way the same process is
discernible. Germany does not show the clustering of
achievement that is characteristic of more centrally located national cultures; the historic process is sporadic
and the· element of greatness is disjointed. The result is
a kind of chaos in which two significant developments
have occurred: on the one hand, there has developed in
the German national culture a maelstrom of ideas imperfectly aligned and conceived. In this setting, cultural
rigidity and an intensity of societal stability, factors held
constant despite variability in historic circumstance, serve
as an overt bulwark against sociocultural pressures from
the outside. On the other hand, however, when genius
does appear on the German scene, it is faced with the
dilemma of being German or not German. When GerThe Minnesota Academy of Science

man greatness is recognized by the world, it is the greatness of the cosmopolitan - the universalist - who is successful despite_ ;German marginality. In music and literature, especially, _where the Germans have made their
most significant contributions to culture, or again in
thought, where the world debt to outstanding Germans is
acknowledged, the concern has ever been with problems
of humanity- not Germans only - in the broadest sense.
As one moves farther northward in Europe and away
from the central developments of the Italian Renaissance,
the Age of Enlightment in France, or even from the political stability afforded by the Spanish Habsburgs or
the age of Elizabeth I, genius becomes less well focused.
England, it is true, does not show quite the same intensity of tradition as marks Italy or France, but the total
British development in literature on the one hand, and
in imperial growth on the other, is sufficient to admit a
discernible and characteristic British pattern. Germany
and Russia share a like place in that their characteristic
constellations are difficult to define. While figures of note
emerge in both countries to mark particular epochs, it is
in no case possible to define Russian or German periods
with the same exactness that one can delimit Shakespeare's England. Neither the Gothic age nor Luther's
era can be designed as specifically German; and Sturm
und Drang, a notable German epoch, it is true, appears
as a one-sided reflection of German marginality, Frederick the Great (whose greatness appears to rest in his
emulation of things French), like his Russian counterpart, Peter, created political spheres that seem to suppress rather than further cultural spontaneity. Further
north in Europe, in Scandinavia_ and the Low Countries,
much the same problem exists. They are marginal areas
in which there is disparity in total growth. One thinks of
the Dutch and Flemish painters, of course, and Ibsen,
Grieg, and, perhaps, Sibelius. There was a great age of
Swedish science, but no comparable developments in literature, art, or philosophy. In these remoter areas, with
smaller populations than either Germany or Russia, culture-historical development takes a somewhat different
tum. The conclusion is that the cultures of Europe that
are central can be defined exactly. Their internal cultural
achievements tend to cluster and reach definable apices
and climaxes. The marginal cultures do not show the
same consistent unfolding.
The German place as a marginal culture thus carries
with it the burden of lack of homogeneous development.
The absence of a concerted integration of the elements
of which German culture is made up causes the German
historical record to appear inconsistent and spotty. The
great literary age that begins with Klopstock and Lessing
brings to mind at once Goethe and Schiller, but is not
paralleled consistently in other areas. And here also the
Germans agonized over problems of tradition, already
resolved elsewhere, with a soul searching that was considerably more intense than in other countries. The search
for improvement in the inventions of others is paradoxically allied with resistance to innovation and with rigidity. A classic example comes out of the modern context:
Italians, never too noted as persistent or indefatigable
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engineers, invented the jet airplane engine but Germans
found the solutions to the technical problems of practical
jet flight and applied the principle to the guided missile.
German traditionalism, so characteristic a fe~ture in the
marginal culture, has tended to stifle invention throughout. Even where the inventor achieves a measure of success he seems to remain the prophet without. __ honor in
Germany. The case of Marx is suggestive o,n -_the ()p.e
hand, while Freud, working in liberal Vienna, ;f_aced far
greater odds than if he had been a Londoner or P~risian.
It follows that Germany's place as a marginal cul~ure,
remembering that it is the total culture itself __that _is in
question, can be subjected to a series of tests. 'In essence,
these are developmental and historical, permitting analysis in comparative terms of compor1ents of German
achievement. Where, for example, do the Germans stand,
in relation to the rest of Europe, in respect to the growth
of philosophic systems, science, the arts - such as literature, music and painting - or the growth of the politically
integrated state as such? In comparison to other European national cultures, the Germans rank quite high in
some of these developments and extremely low in others.
This striking disparity in German cultural growths is lent
perspective only when viewed in terms of a comparative
time sequence. In the Middle Ages, when the Church was
a dominant force on the face of Europe, and feudal law,
medieval scholasticism, and the Carlovingian and Othonian heritage were uppermost, there is little to choose
between Germany and France or Britain. German knights
were in the forefront of the Crusades along with other
Western Europeans. But when classicism made its return,
when the worldly humanism of Italy began to change the
color of the European scene, Germany suffered a lag.
Overshadowed by Henry VIII and Francis I, by the
splendors of Madrid and the petty yet highly sophisticated Italian courts, the German princes clung with tenacious stubbornness to their last vestiges of Gothicism and
feudalism. And later, it was a psychological expatriate,
the sullen Frederick the Great, who sought to recapture
in Potsdam the French glories of a past century and generation.
These points suggest that the culture-historic process
operated among the Germans in ways different from
those affecting other sections of Europe. When the temporal aspects of German development are considered, it
can be demonstrated that the whole of German culture
possessed a particular kind of integration, in which the
total constellation of the component elements was, in
essence, different from that of neighboring nations.
German Thought

The point has been made that the Germans, in accordance with their marginal cultural place, have subjected
ideas of refinement but have not been inventors. In the
development of philosophical systems in Germany, this
feature is clearly demonstrable. As with other aspects of
cultural growth, the German time lag is evident. Not
only do systems of thought arise later in Germany than
in other segments of Western Europe but, as a result of
marginality, a_process of selectivity has been at work.
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The Germans have been free to make certain kinds of
choices, accepting one point of view, exhibiting indifference to another; and indeed, once a choice has been
made, intellectual growth is influenced. Thus, although
it is apparent that Kant was stimulated by Descartes,
Locke, and Hume, and although he developed his system
in the framework of Western culture out of which the
Cartesian and other systems also have come, his twisting
of his materials paved the way for another paradox - the
fact that an avowed human free will is pitted against the
existing rigidity of a social system. To understand what
the Germans have done in their intellectual life- creating elaborate philosophical systems - it is necessary to
understand the consequences of marginality and cultural
time lag: lack of balance and extremism.
' With respect to the growth of the German philosophical schools and systems, the initial question is that of
temporal development. Intellectual life reflects society
and cultural premises and serves also to stabilize and
justify social norms; it is an index of culture process and
may be examined as a factor in the kind of total sociocultural integration that the Germans have achieved.
Thus, two aspects of the emergence of German thought
are to be considered: on the one hand, there is the essential delay in the growth of what might be called characteristic and distinctive German systems; on the other
hand such systems, arising in the climate of German culture, are in themselves forces that defend the past and
channel the future.
For purposes of this discussion, and in the light of the
foregoing considerations, thought may be defined in its
very broadest context. It may be said to include all facets
of those abstract intellectual movements that, propounded
by intellectuals in the cloisters and university centers,
have come to influence and shape the cultural setting of
Germany. Admittedly, there is an arbitrary quality in
respect to the latter point. Copernicus, as a scientist, falls
into the German realm by virtue of his birth and activity;
similarly, Leibnitz, as mathematician and philosopher, is
definitely to be associated with the German historical
scene. But both are anomalous in their place and age,
standing seemingly as cultural isolates and reflecting not
a German growth but, rather, one attributable to Western
European civilization as a whole. Although Wolff (16791754) systematized Leibnitz, the influence of the latter
was pan-European and was infinitely less significant in
the Germany of his day than elsewhere·. Leibnitz, in fact,
becomes a precursor of the Age of Enlightenment, a
complex that has little place in German culture. Copernicus, too, as a German-Pole by accident of birth, falls
outside the stream of, development of things specifically
German. Thought may be widely defined, but when
viewed as a cultural en,d product, one is concerned more
with culture and thinker or, in an even broader sense
and leaving the specific realm of philosophy, with the
cultural determinism operative in respect to the inventor
as opposed to the part that the inventor himself plays
in perpetuating the cultural system in which he functions
(White, 1949: 190-232). The contrast in the present case
is between the universal man and the specifically Ger168

man man. Neither Copernicus nor Leibnitz meet the
criteria for the latter; the genius that they demonstrate
arises out of a climate of universalism. Hence they are
unpredictable and anomalous in respect to German philosophical and scientific growth.
When thought is viewed as a cultural end product, it
is restricted to growths that arise out of a cultural context
and reflect the cultural whole. In German culture, two
major movements occur as secular philosophy is pitted
against religious thought. Each has a place, and each
represents an unfolding of the culture-historic process.
In the embrace of the German cultural position, neither
the Lutheran Reformation nor the idealism of Kant and
his successors is out of place. Although the two forces
differ in time of development and are conceptually at
odds, it is no accident that they come together today.
The romantic theologians, if such they may be called,
such as Rudolf Otto, Barth, Tillich and others, seem
possible only in a German context. German culture can
still admit mystics and still produce saints; the secularism
of Britain, France, the United States and even Italy cannot.
Viewed in his time and age in 1517, Luther is no
anomaly as is his contemporary, Copernicus. The Reformation is Germany's great contribution to Western
European culture. It is a particularistic religio-philosophical movement that follows hard on the heels of the
Renaissance. As a cultural product, the Reformation reflects a distinctive sociocultural organization and a special pattern and level of cultural integration. It is no
accident that Lutheranism becomes characteristic of Germany and, specifically, of north Germany, where Catholicism is less deeply rooted and less vital, than in Bavaria
or Austria. But the Reformation would not have been
possible without the stimulation of the Renaissance; it
is, in fact, Germany's response to it at the time, for the
implicit classicism of the Renaissance is to reach the Germans considerably later. Despite marginality, there is
sufficient force and energy in German culture to produce
a disjointed and secondary culture center, which is what
happened during the Reformation, and to influence more
marginal cultures to the north. Lutheranism became established in the Scandinavian countries but did not reach
the Low Countries, France, Scotland, or England. It is
clear that Henry VIII, whatever his attitude toward papal
authority, had no sympathy with Luther. Luther's significance for Germany, however, was as much secular as
religious: he provided the rationale for the country's
social structure, a basis for the stability of the family system that has influenced both Catholic and Protestant
alike.
Or, by contrast, turning to the more clearly secular
philosophers, the important beginning of German-philosophy lies with Kant, followed in turn by the distinguished thinkers of the early and middle nineteenth century. Kant, by creating a dialectic that renders the positions of both Locke and Hume untenable, paved the way
for Fichte, Hegel, and Nietzsche and ultimately was responsible for the raison d'etre of the German state that
was established in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
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Both the Lutheran and the Kantian developments, as
contrasted to the cultural growth in other European countries, are not only late in time but, more importantly, are
distortions of existing European patterns, systems, and
tendencies. Neither Luther nor Kant and his followers
would have been possible in a setting other than that of
German culture.
The historical facts of the rise of Lutheranism need no
repetition here. The interests and influences that motivated the German princes who supported the Lutheran
movement are sufficiently well understood to require no
further comment. What is remarkable is the consistent
conservatism of these very rulers and the states of Germany prior to the Reformation. Schism in the medieval
church was a common phenomenon in areas outside Germany long before Luther. In the thirteenth century there
were the Albigensians in France; in the fourteenth, England was rocked by the anti-papal teachings of Wycliffe;
and the Lollards long remained a thorn in the side of the
British kings. It was Wycliffe, indeed, who influenced
John Huss. But it remained for Luther to work in a climate in which such schism could take lasting root. Although Calvin, like Luther, took an extreme position, it
was Luther who formulated the revolutionary and wholly
immoderate doctrine of salvation by faith. For his day,
Luther's position was extreme but it was only moderately so when compared with the communistic ideals of
Menno Simons or the Anabaptist theocracy. At this point
in German history, the kind of cultural balance that the
Germans achieve is clearly discernible. It is not one of
basic moderation or of simple reform. Instead, the
changes are sweeping, wholly dramatic, demanding in
extreme terms a repudiation of ties with the past. Luther, as is known, thought of himself initially as a mere
reformer but, as the doctrines gained momentum, was
carried along into his extremist position.
There can be little doubt of Luther's early humanism.
In him the tie with the classic past - at least in medieval
terms - are expressed in his visit to Rome, his Latinity
as well as his skill in Greek and Hebrew, and his doctorate in theology, and bespeak the cultured individual
of the day. But there comes a point when the veneer rubs
off, when he ceases to be the universal man and becomes
the German. Luther's theology is in itself no startling
innovation. It represents a trend toward simplification, as
seen in the reduction of sacraments and the changes in
the conception of the body ecclesiastical. Its significance,
for purposes of the present discussion, lies not in the
person,of the innovator himself, in such questions as Luther's debt to Staupitz and others, or in the immediate
political and economic influences operative in shaping the
Reformation and its German success (in all this, there is
a parallel in Calvin and many others, not excluding
Henry VIII), but rather in the fact of Luther's "Deutschtum," his role as a German in a German setting. It is not
so much what Luther accomplished, but rather the way
in which he accomplished what he did. In this sense,
Luther, not content with half-way measures, lays about
him with a doctrinal club. His results must be immediate
and extreme. Fromm is right when he suggests an analogy
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between Luther and Hitler. These are extremist personality types, it is true, but it is the culture that produces
the climate in which such personalities can act, the culture that both creates the type and gives latitude to the
situation.
If Luther's activity represents imperfect sociocultural
balance and integration, it must also be remembered that
Reformation Germany was being torn asunder by events.
But even if such events - the Peasant War, the rise of
new economic institutions, the creation of new occupations, the increase in and redistribution of wealth, and a
realignment of social classes - created a situation in
which the new Lutheranism could more readily flourish,
they reflect together with the modified religious forms,
rapidity of change and the absence of inventiveness or,
in short, they reflect the country's marginal cultural position. Other national entities could adjust far more readily to such trends that symbolized the dying Middle Ages,
possibly because the process of change in their countries
was an infinitely more gradual one. In Germany, the
sweeping social reordering took the form of revolution.
Instead of coming about slowly in a manner that permitted experimentation and accommodation, Germany's
cultural changes are promoted from diverse sources
within a remarkably short period of time. And most important, they are not the products of an organic German
growth. Indeed, Luther's movement arises in the concept
of reform of something that fundamentally is not German. That he makes it so, contributing thereby to a specifically German religious and social expression, is his
achievement.
Luther's success is the success of an individual in harmony with his culture. His problem, in view of the awe
with which his culture regarded established authority, is
the break with Rome. But Rome was far away, and having once placed authority in the hands of God - indeed,
having identified God in terms of the family system of
his day - he arrived at an- adequate solution that dovetailed with existing cultural institutions. One has only to
consider, for example, his catechismal treatment of the
God-Father concept. 5 Lutheranism is not new but it
represents a pecularly compatible alignment with the
cultural matrix from which it emerges. Luther is acted
on by his culture but also acts on it: he aids in crystallizing the cultural norm and becomes the pivotal point
around which social forms can cluster.
Southern Germany and Austria, of course, remain Roman Catholic. Here is paradox again, Admittedly, the
quality of Bavaria is different from that of Prussia or
Schleswig-Holstein. One has only to cross the political
boundary between the Reich and Austria to obtain a subjective, but definite, awareness of difference. But it is a
difference of degree and not one of kind. The German
civil wars of the seventeenth century, although avowedly
5
From the introduction to the commentary on the Lord's
Prayer, (Kurze Auslegung des kleinen Kateclzismus, var.): Gott
will uns damit locken, dass wir glauben sollen, er sei unser
rechter Vater und wir seine rechten Kinder, auf dass wir getrost
und mit aller Zuversicht ihn bitten sollen wie die lieben Kinder
ihren lieben Yater.
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religious in origin, miircir the same cultural pattern on
both sides. Luther's significance, it is worth repeating,
lies not in the formation of new sects and new dogmas
but, rather, in his crystallization of a German ethos that
is derived from the past, and, although given Lutheran
momentum, is applicable to Germans, regardless of religious persuasion.
The Lutheran spasm must be viewed at considerable
distance and, because of the strong emotionalism that it
evokes, it is difficult to obtain a detached and critical
view. The problem of German marginality in respect to
thought and the growth of thought on German soil is
somewhat more easily resolved on the level of the secular. It is conceded that the Germans have produced
some of the leading figures in Western philosophy. German thought becomes crucial and problematical, however, when it is considered as a whole, that is, not only
because of its temporal development but, also, because
of its remarkable intensity. A channel is dug by Kant
and continued by his followers. The Kantian heritage,
like the Lutheran, sets so forceful a tone for the future
that little variation can occur. In France, Britain, and
even America, nuance is given its due; experiment is possible to the point, in fact, where superficiality comes at
times to keynote intellectual movements. This is a pitfall
sedulously avoided by the German thinker. The German
intellectual tradition sheds frivolity in any form. It is
serious, uncompromising and always stern. On the secular side, it seems to represent hardly more than a series
of variations on a theme by Kant. But stark realism is
contrasted with heavy-handed mysticism, the heritage of
German romanticism. Even the German mystic, however,
allows no compromise. Rudolf Otto's idea of the "holy,"
in religious terms, permits no more equivocation than do
the ideas of Marx. But this momentarily aside, the German intellectual tradition, as a pattern of culture, allows
some interesting temporal comparisons.
The rise of the German intellectual, outside the realm
of the religious, harks back initially to cosmopolitanism
rather than provincialism. Copernicus and Leibnitz, as
well as Kepler, cannot readily be identified with Germany. The same is generally true of so great a humanistphilosopher as Gotthold Ephraim Lessing ( 1729-81) .
Attacking the notion of Christian supremacy in his
drama Na than der Weise (177 8), Lessing holds all religious expression of whatever form to have its place
in the human spiritual sphere. He thus argues that the
accidents of history have no relation to the truths established by reason. Considered in this light, Lessing is no
German but, instead, a cosmopolitan participant in the
Age of Reason, a follower of Rousseau. It is no surprise
to note that Adolf Harnack, more than a century later,
feels obliged to repudiate such humanistic heresy and to
reaffirm Christian supremacy in its creed of suffering and
martyrdom. Lessing, however much he may pave the way
for Germany's great literary period in the late eighteenth
century, is another German anomaly. It may be said of
him that he achieves genius in his time and place despite
being German. Parenthetically, it is worth noting that
even on the secular side the German preoccupation re170

mains religious and deals with religiou1nhemes. Clearly,
the kind of introspection that this denotes is, perhaps
paralleled in Russia but is not found in any other nation
of Western Europe. They, once the storm and stress of
humanism and religion passed, inclined to secular thought.
It is no accident that the outstanding theologians of the
modern world are Germans.
The trend toward the growth of secular philosophical
systems arises in Europe after the Renaissance-Reformation. It may be agreed that Italy and Spain had reached
their zenith of development somewhat earlier and that
the centers of intellectual growth had shifted northward
and westward. Thus, Macchiavelli belongs to a somewhat
earlier period, as do the great Jewish and Mosarab philosophers in Spain. Still, in Italy, the pattern of intellectualism persists into the sixteenth century in the person of Giordano Bruno. It is already difficult to identify
Bruno as an Italian, however, since, as a Calvinist, he
was associated with both England and France. In Elizabethan times the beginning of a new intellectual era is
marked by the development of a presystemic philosophical mode with Francis Bacon. The pattern is insignificant
in itself, perhaps, but reflects the totality of creative
energy operative in Britain of that day. It is the beginning
of a post-Renaissance trend, one in which Germany is
not to share for over two centuries. This being so, a comparison is in order to place German thought in the matrix
of European development.
A. L. Kroeber, an anthropologist interested in the
problem of culture growth, centers of development, and
influences radiating from such centers in time and space,
has painstakingly reviewed the comparative data (Kr'oeber, 1944). He is concerned with patterns of growth
- florescence and peak - and with the decline of various
aspects of human achievement across the world. He conveniently indicates the comparative dating of European
thought and its general historical course. His analysis
indicates that German philosophy is not only late in
coming into its own but, paradoxically, is the most vital
and clearly the longest lived in Europe. The point is interesting as a further indication of German marginality.
The German historic process was such that it encouraged
and permitted the flowering of philosophical systems,
even if, as will be seen, the systems themselves provided
a rationale for the behavior that led to German degradation. It is also of interest that Russia, still more remotely
removed from the centers of development, produced no
thinkers worthy of the name. In Russia, in fact, it was a
German, a post-Kantian traditionalist, who provided
the keynote for the modern state. The marginal character
of German thought, as exemplified by the German-influenced Russian, is further attested by its extremism. The
systems, once established, become fixed and continue to
be expounded long after new preoccupations have arisen
elsewhere. The comparison of culture centers in time and
space, as summarized from Kroeber's analysis, reveals
not only the presence of culture centers themselves but
the kinds of constellations that such centers permit. Even
if one chooses only those figures whose genius or im-
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portance is universally acknowledged, a distinct pattern
is apparent ( Kroeber, 1944: 46-62) .
France: The development of French thought undergoes three distinct periods. The first and second are separated by somewhat more than a half century and reflect a preoccupation with systems and logical exposition.
The earliest dominant figure is, of course, Descartes,
whose Discourse de la Methode appeared in 1637. He
and his contemporaries are preoccupied with concepts
of science and derive much of their approach to systemic
ordering from mathematics. Descartes is no lonesome
figure, a further reflection of the fact that internal stimulation is a necessary prerequisite to the growth of a
culture center. It is clear, however, that the Cartesian
movement surpasses the contemporary scientific inquiries
of Mersenne or the eloquent logical theology of Pascal.
This initial Cartesian period is then replaced by the
neo-humanism and naturalism of the eighteenth century.
This, the great period, may be said to lie between the appearance of Voltaire's Lettres Philosophiques in 1731
and the social upheaval of 1789, or perhaps, as Kroeber
sees it, the publication of Condorcet's Progres de l'Esprit
humain in 1794. Unlike the scientifically oriented seventeenth century, the main figures of the Age of Enlightenment experiment with forms, drama, and the novel,
and thus are with difficulty dissociated from creative
writers. Between Diderot, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and
so many others, a distinct period emerges in the mideighteenth century. It is a period that influences and
shapes the Germans but, interestingly enough, only the
great German poets and dramatists.
The third or final French period, the nineteenth century, is marked by a return to science and Comte is the
dominant figure. But, by this time, France has taken
on something of the marginal quality itself and its great
period of productivity is over. German scientism has already outstripped French creativity and neither Bergson,
nor, in modern times, Sartre, can as yet be taken seriously.
Britain: The growths of British thought, in which the
Scotch developments also play a significant part, parallel
the French in time. Unlike the French, British thinkers
do not have a great impact.on an immediately succeeding
period. Locke, for example, influenced France and was
widely read by the French eighteenth century Physiocrats, such as Turgot and d' Alembert but - unless his
part in the shaping of colonial thought in America be
considered - does not provide a step toward revolution
in the same way that Rousseau does. Locke and, later,
Hume, are far more significant in influencing the development of modern British and American sociopolitical institutions (Northrop, 1947: III-116) . From the point of
view of immediate effects, the French patterns are more
dramatic, but the British, it would seem, are longer .lasting. And it is Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, in fact, who
provide the motivation for Kant.
British thought begins with Bacon but does not reach
systematized proportions until Hobbes, whose Leviathan
was published in 1651. After Hobbes, Locke (16321704) and Berkeley (1685-1753) emerge as the domin-
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ant earlier figures of a British philosophical period.
Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding appeared between 1680 and 1690 and Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge in 1710. They were dominant personalities but the same general epoch saw many
more. The next development in British thought shifts to
Scotland. This is later in time and parallels the French
development of the mid-eighteenth century. The leading
figure is, of course, Hume (1711-1776). Britain first, but
then Scotland, indicate the swing toward the secular. By
the nineteenth century, paralleling the Comtean age in
France, the scientific philosophers, with their concern
with human progress, come to the fore. Bentham, Malthus, Mill, Herbert Spencer, and others, suggest continuing trend and a further parallel to France in the alliance of thought with scientific methods. (Reichenbach,
1951).
While the present discussion has deliberately omitted
some very important thinkers in both France and Great
Britain, sufficient number has been cited to indicate a
general trend. There are differences between the two
countries in style and pattern, in concern and preoccupation with problems and clearly, some difference
in temporal quality. Both, however, represent culture
centers, not only in respect to thought, but in other aspects of development as well. It is difficult to select the
abstract thinker per se, since it is apparent that on the
one hand, the scientist and mathematician, such as Newton, Lamarck, or Darwin, must be passed over, while on
the other, the poet, dramatist, or novelist fail to gain
their proper share of attention. But the implication is
perhaps clear. France and Britain pass through several
epochs of greatness, of tremendous productivity and invention, and of the clustering of what can be called genius. Moreover, the periods of productivity that have been
noted here correspond to periods of national greatness;
these are periods of the harnessing and channeling of
creative energy. It must be concluded that the total
civilization - the cultural milieu - sets the stage that
permits breadth of expression. It creates the climate in
which such expression can reach a peak or climax. The
same historic processes, causing a shift in climate, bring
these epochs of maximum intensity to an end; the pattern
changes when perfection of integration ceases and when
creative energies are dispelled. Because the British and
French, beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, have been able to create, to "invent," as it were,
complex and new idea systems, and because other aspects of their respective developments fall significantly
into line, they can be regarded as centers of culture and
givers of civilization.
The same temporal clustering is not paralleled elsewhere. There is, to be sure, the aberrant figure, such as
Spinoza in Holland. But if it is remembered that Spinoza
carries on a tradition begun centuries earlier in Mosarab
Spain, it is clear that he does not belong to the Dutch
setting. Similarly, Kierkegaard, like Spinoza, lacks national contemporaries. The occasional exception personality will be found outside a central focus and is,
perhaps, the greater genius for it, since his culture fails
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to provide him with an adequate framework in which to
operate.

that Kant's hypotheses are carried to their inevitable
and logical conclusion by Adolf Hitler. Th~ _Germans
of the nineteenth century, by successfuly ndmg dead
Germany: The influences of the French Age of
horses, by repudiating the new an~ carrying the ~1~ to
Enlightenment and the English-Scotch peaks of deits ultimacy, manage to balance science a~d mystlc~sm,
velopment made themselves felt on the gro"'.th of Qer,- _
philosophy and theology. They become mystic theologians
man thought fairly immediately. If Lutheramsm can be
and dry fact-gatherers at the same time, indifferent to
viewed as a German response to the .intellectual movethe British nineteenth century ideal of scientific progress
ments in several other centers, so also can the reasonor the logical syntheses of Comte. Scientists p~r exceling of Kant and the influences he wields be regarded as
lence, they fail to grasp the implications _of science ~or
a latter-day and essentially German respons_e to external
society. Great philosophers, theirs is a different reality
stimuli. In England and France, one can pomt to Bacon,
from that known to other Western men. The marginal
Hobbes, and Descartes as representatives of a trend toculture, in summary, in its extremism, inhibits a l?gical
ward the establishment of secular systems of thou?ht.
and easy connection between ideal and overt behavior.
There is no corresponding parallel in Germany. It mi¥ht
If the long period of florescence of German_ thought
be argued that the Thirty Years' War had a retro~rading
may be said to come to an end, at least, as far as the
effect on cultural developments in Germany - mdeed,
development of formal system is concerned, with Nietthere are many historians who would support t~is conzsche, attempts at renaissance have been made, some not
tention - but on the other hand, since out of strife may
altogether unsuccessfully. The course of the nineteenth
be born productivity, as the age of Cro1:1well _in Britain
century reveals a disparate quality, an absence of synattests one is led in Germany to a considerat10n of the
thesis, and a perpetuation of endeavor in unrelated chansevent~enth century as a period of stagnation, a perio? of
nels. It is out of this disunity of purpose that the Gerstress following an imperfectly integrated Reformation.
mans, however indifferent they ·may remain to secular
Hence, when in the eighteenth century such figures as
nuance have become the theologians of the age. The
Kant and Lessing appear, it is evident that they lack
quality' of mysticism, of pther-worldly st~iving, chara~German precursors and that the forces that influence
terizes not only the mystic poets and pamters, seen m
them come from without. This, as has been seen, was
a near contemporary such as Rilke, but remains as a
true in the case of Lessing and, earlier, of Leibnitz. It
conspicuous feature of the German theological schools.
is particularly true in the case of Kant.
The near Gnosticism of Tillich, Troeltsch, Barth, or
Kant's long life ( 1724-1804) overlaps that of several
Otto , as well as numerous others, indicates a repudiation
eighteenth century thinkers, among the?1 He~der and
(Otto, 1936).
Goethe. With these, since he first published m 1746,
Nazism and World Wars I and II· have unquesKant represents an initial phase, a formative epo~h ~r
tionably a part to play in bringing this about as a genpulse of German thought. It is not, ho"'.ever, until his
eral tendency but, in a sense, Lutheranism, in the soil
maturity, in the period 1781-88, that his great ':"orks
in which it grew, calls forth the same degree of exappear. From this decade on there is the era of clim~x,
tremism
in thought as do Nietzsche and Marx. Failing
the Blutezeit of German philosophical growth, which
to
come
to
grips with the world and society, the German
may be said to terminate in 1819 with the publication
theologian
turns
his back to it, seeking a spiritual selfof Schopenhauer's Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.
immersion.
And
it is precisely this feature that makes
Thus between 1781 and 1819, there appear in Gerpossible sainthood and the bloodbath in the same culman;, along with Kant, Fichte, Schelling; Schleierture.
macher, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, to_ ~ention _only a
Finally, to this movement in modernism may be addfew of the more prominent names. This IS a penod esed
the name of the philosopher-novelist, Thomas Mann.
sentially comparable to the earlier climactic epochs a~By
universal agreement here is the outstanding literary
parent in France and Britain. Unli~e these, ~owever, It
creator
of the present day. Mann is a German who seeks,
seems more intense more productive, and m essence
like his theological contemporaries, a universal and
more reflective of the national ethos than do the earlier
hence nonGerman solution in a German setting. From
counterparts elsewhere. Clearly, too, it is more rigid. It
Buddenbrooks to Felix Krull he watches society change,
permits little by way of experimental deviation. As an
but
he is no social philosopher. In the Olympian withaspect of total culture, German thought illustrates the
drawal
of Zauberberg he combines the Hegelian congeneral trend.
cept
of
will with a deep sense of humanity in a way
_So it is that the nineteenth century witnesses a long
that
amounts
almost to arrogance. And finally, being a
decline, a feature that has no comparable counterpart
German, Mann must epitomize the Faust theme and the
in either France or Britain. Feuerbach and Hartmann,
German paradox; Doktor Faustus, as the eternal Gerand, especially, Marx, suggest the continuing slavery
man still seeks his soul. Mann offers no system and no
to the period of climax. And at the end, one is lost in
solu{ion; as a novelist, this is not his task. His place is
the maze of paradox, freedom versus anti-freedom
interesting, however, making as it seems to do the end
expressed so bitterly by Nietzsche or, indeed, by Richard
of an age, a time that began with Lessing and Goethe,
Wagner. Froin Kant to Marx to Nietzsche may seem a
endured the long nineteenth century, and finally came to
horrendous step. That it is not is indicated by the fact
grief on the Hitlerian shoals.
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If a German cycle has ended in our own day and if,
as James B. Conant seems to think, West Germany is
talcing the road of American pragmatism, does the foture promise a new direction? (Conant, 1957). Such a
prediction must obviously be reserved. But when the
cultural hypothesis is again considered, the problem of
German marginality and extremism seems · in no way
diminished. German thought of the period of Kant and
his epigones came to have so startling an influence on the
shaping of the German national character that it would
certainly be amiss merely to say that German thought
is late in developing. The French Age of Enlightenment
had a social effect that was immediate and shattering,
leading as it did directly to the French Revolution and
the rise of Napoleonic nationalism. There was a parallel
in Germany in that the Germans succeeded all too well
in putting into practise the ideals put forth by Kant and,
particularly, by his followers, Fichte and Hegel. Out of
the moral ideas of Kant and the dialectic logic of Fichte
and Hegel arose the concept of German Kultur, an idea,
one must hasten to add, not to be identified with the
broader sense of process, as described here, but rather
a conceptual end-point. It is this notion, of German
Kultur as a product of will, clearly not of the endresult of a process of evolution, that comes to motivate
the Germans so strongly through the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. It is the idea of moral superiority, baldly put into racist terms by the Nazis, and
it is the basis for German nationalism. The latter point,
in fact, is highly significant, creating as it does a cultural
and moral fatherland, a patriotism founded less in land
and state, in flag and society, and more in the selfrighteousness of assumed moral authority and superiority
(Northrop, 1947:202-215). The Germans are not without a view of themselves as the chosen people. Japan had
it, too, it will be recalled, and Russia possesses a
slightly changed version. In Germany, the idea of cultural superiority seems to stem from the Reformation,
from the notion of Luther and the Germans as instruments in the hand of God. But it remained for the
Kantian development to lend it meaning and system.
Why indeed should Kant, Fichte, and Hegel be so
important? It is simply that these philosophers succeeded in epitomizing intellectual currents already operative in the totality of German culture, on the one hand,
and setting the tone for the manifestations of German
intellectual (and political) behavior on the other. Theirs
became the systems promulgated in the German universities. This philosophical triumvirate, beginning with
the milder Kant, avowedly seeks flaws in the scientific
and philosophical systems advanced by Descartes, Locke,
and Hume. It finds them and, in finding them, charts
Germany's intellectual course in a direction away from
the democratic political institutions that characterize
Britain and, particularly, the United States. In this sense,
because their influence is by no means dead - Marxism,
after all, is an off-shoot of the Hegelian system - they
have made German destiny.
Any system · of thought is a cultural product, that
is, in order to be meaningful and accepted it must arise
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within an established framework of understandings and
conventions. If out of joint with the total milieu, it can
have neither significance nor place. In this sense, Kantianism and Hegelianism are cultural products, brought
about by a specific kind of background and circumstance. And, in this sense, too, any cultural product
is culturally determined. A caution is in order since the
Hegelian dialectic of history and Spengler's views at
on_ce conceptually intrude. Cultural determinism, as the
term is used here, means no more than that any human
invention, of whatever kind, is to be viewed as an effect
arising out of antecedent causes. It is the simple truism
that one would not expect a small isolated hunting population to develop a complex religious system in which
the hunting theme did not appear. Or, to put it in another
way, an Eskimo is out of place in a grass skirt. Historical (and cultural) determinism, as conceived by
Hegel, is of an entirely different order. It is an easy
step from Kant through Fichte and Hegel and it is easy
to see how Hegel is able to identify the absolute of will
and the ideal of history. Hegel's concept of history is
evolutionary, it is true, but clearly not in the sense of
the British social evolutionists who appear later in the
same century. It is, instead, the elicitation of the ultimate
will, a determinative process of history that produces
the good, the divine, and the German. In this sense,
Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, like Luther, provide a rationale
and so succeed in stabilizing German sociocultural institutions.
The Nazi movement, or indeed, the Lutheran Reformation, the German expression in the time of Frederick the Great or Wilhelm II, are wholly comprehen- ·
sible in the light of the philosophy of the nineteenth
century Germans beginning with Kant. In the idealistic
notions of Fichte and Hegel, in the moral ideas of Kant,
there is the implicit paradox that freedom of the will
leads to determinism. Because, according to Fichte, man
is not moral unless by ~ act of will, such an act arising
from within and unconditioned by considerations of nature and culture, it follows that he who can make a
show of will and is able to enforce it is the human ultimate. This explains much, providing a justification for
German authoritarianism, for the superman ideal, for
the Nazi state. Philosophy thus rationalizes social institutions. A driving will, in Hegel's view, sets its ends
and destroys all in its way to achieve them. The individual who shapes history does so with an act of will.
This is moral and good, achieved not in and with nature, but by rising above and overcoming nature.
In summary, the total cultural expression that can
be derived from Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, not to mention the thematic variations that can be seen in Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and again, not excluding
Marx, represent a closing of the German ranks against
the outside. It follows that there is an implicit denial of
freedom and the premise of human equality that was
put forth by such a philosopher as Locke. This is an
extreme expression, one reflecting the intensity of the
German ethos, the rationale for it, and the tremendous
output of energy that has been required to maintain it.
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The same kind of extremism, borrowed from Germany,
reaches another marginal culture and it is no accident
that the historical determinism of Goebbels differs from
that of the Soviet Union only in degree.
Considerable space has been devoted here to a review not so much of the content of the German systems
of thought - although admittedly this is extremely important - as of the ways in which these systems bear
out a concept of German national culture. A system of
thought, stemming from culture but serving then to
stabilize and to channel cultural norms, has far reaching
repercussions. In Germany, this becomes equally true of
the related area of science and scientific thought.
German Science

The Germans were noted as mediaeval scientists and
distinguished themselves in mathematics, botany, astronomy, and several other fields (Kroeber, 1944: 154162) . The economic upsurge of the late Middle Ages,
resulting as it did in shifts of occupation and labor
specializations, stimulated technological change in Germany. Not the least of the German creations of the
preLutheran era was the invention of printing. But, as
has been seen, the late Middle Ages were less well
differentiated both politically and socially. Not only
was the period one of general unrest, which was to culminate in the Reformation, but, as a result, there was a
general receptivity to new ideas across Europe. Germany shared in this character and climate of cosmopolitanism; its marginal lag was not yet wholly manifest.
Prague and Vienna, as well as many German cities,
were becoming centers of learning and helping to provide
foci of activity.
Probably much of an initial growth of German science
can be explained as a result of medieval and pre-Reformation pan-Europeanism. Several scientists emerge
out of this context. There is Copernicus, the GermanPole (1472-1543), and also his predecessors, Cusanus
and Regiomontanus, and many others, scientists and
mathematicians, who reflect the age. The Reformation
marks a continuation of this somewhat freer intellectual
exchange. Copernicus and his pan-European contemporaries can probably be explained thus, and it is also
worth noting that when the Reformation gained momentum, there was a corresponding flurry of activity
in art, particularly in painting, music, and science. Kroeber locates much of this, particularly the scientific activity, in Saxony where, along with the Lutheran movement, several streams converged and where there was
an apparent stimulation to productive activity. It is after
the Reformation, when the free intellectual climate of a
humanistic Europe is broken by the emergence of better
defined national interests and religious suspicions, that
Germany recedes more and more into obscurity.
Thus, the science in Germany of the seventeenth
century is much more difficult to explain. Some of the
free spirit of inquiry seems to have persisted among the
scientists of Europe, but Galileo and the school of Pisa
do not explain the uniqueness of the German, Kepler.
He and Leibnitz are unique in Germany since the other
174

patterns of development in art, literature, and thought,
do not keep pace.
There follows a long sterile period. Germany has no
personality corresponding to Descartes (in his role as
scientist), Fermat, or Pascal. Nor is there any German
counterpart of Isaac Newton. German science begins,
at least in its modern orientations, with the last decade
of the eighteenth century, at a time essentially coterminous with the rise of the secular philosophical systems.
Considering the neighboring national cultures, it can be
seen that Germany was exceptionally late in developing
its science, even remoter Sweden had made daring advances through its many eighteenth century investigators
long before any German ascendancy.
The growth of science in Germany reflects a sudden
and tremendous burst of energy that is seen in the remarkable versatility of German activity. It begins in
mathematics and astronomy ( with Gauss, the mathematician, in 1799) , and moves quickly into the physical
and biological fields. There is little of scientific interest
in the world that has not been explored thoroughly and
painstakingly by Germans. Added to this has been the
German interest in applied science, not only in engineering and medicine, but in technology generally. How
else, indeed, could the Germans of the twentieth century
have twice created a fantastic war potential and ma.chine? As noted earlier, the Germans have been technological improvers rather than inventors and innovators.
In borrowing the industrial complex from Britain, the
German factories could, by virtue of the lateness of the
Industrial Revolution, modernize and surpass Britain
by the development of newer methods and machinery.
After about 1800 or, perhaps, after Goethe's scientific work, the German scientists begin to cluster. This
is so marked, in fact, that one is at a loss to select representative names. What, for example, of Haeckel,
Wundt, Virchow, Mach, or, for that matter, Freud?
The list is endless. But, omitting Freud for a moment,
it must be noted that there is a monotonous quality to
German science. Its representatives are ardent discoverers, unshakable seekers after truth, but it seems fair to
say that they lack originality. There is no German Lamarck or Mendel, no Davy, Lyell, Galton, or, especially,
no Darwin. This is no implied criticism of German
science; it is uniformly painstaking, of the highest quality. It is good, but it is not reflective of genius. German
science lacks the flair for imaginative endeavor. It improves, it sets an inordinately high premium on scholarship and truth, but it lacks, in the end, insight and subtlety. This is why Freud, one of the most significant
figures in modern times, must be excepted. Freud, the
Austrian, introduces precisely what German science fails
to present - a new system and new kinds of insights.
It is not difficult to understand why ,German science
should have taken this particular course. It is late in
comparison with developments in the rest of Western
Europe and it is, hence, marginal. The Germans possessed some insecurity about the imprecise and the imaginative, laying emphasis on the known and the knowable
in the Kantian sense. Further, although the Germans
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stressed freedom of will and, hence, freedom of investigation, they were paradoxically bound to a formal system in which the subordinate individual, the student,
could not deviate from the path set by the superior, the
teacher. It is no surprise to discover that it was the
Germans who invented the idea of "academic freedom"
- this clearly follows from the line of reasoning that
Kant makes explicit - but, at the same time, they never
learned to live with it. A rationale for the scientific
method lay in Kant's "categories of the understanding,"
the relatedness of things perceived by the knowing mind.
Out of such a concept arises the German scientific
methodology of the nineteenth century, a characteristic
by no means abandoned today. This produced the need
for order and detail and if, as Kant himself says, the
Germans incline toward pedantry, this is a feature that
his own philosophical system decisively promulgated and
did nothing to erase.
German science, of however high an order it may be,
and however dedicated to scientific procedure, is nevertheless characterized by an absence of the scientific
method. The gathering of data became an end in itself,
regardless of discipline and field of inquiry, and intimidated and discouraged the would-be theorist. In the
German universities, the atmosphere paradoxically encouraged freedom of research and new endeavor but
punished him who was so bold as to draw conclusions.
How familiar it is, in fact, to hear the German savant,
a man tremendously learned in astrophysics, Tibetan
iconography, or ethnology, remark- "Ah, I cannot yet
publish; I do not have all the facts!" There are exceptions of course - Max Weber and Wilhelm Wundt in
the social sciences, Rudolf Virchow in medicine and
anthropology, the Swiss, Jacob Burckhardt, in history,
Freud - but the general result has been to channel science. Classification, ordering, synthesis, laudable and
necessary though they may be, have produced a stultification. The imaginative scientist, blessed with insight and
imagination, with daring sufficient to essay interpretations or so bold as to question the nature of fact, is the
German rara avis. More often, when such attempts are
made, they fall afoul of brooding mysticism, Hegelian
determinism, or Hitlerian pseudoscience.
As a final note, and a somewhat more optimistic one,
the splendid activity of German scientists, particularly
in the nineteenth century, is not to be decried. Britain
and the United States, particularly, succumbed to the
force of German scientific scholarship. The Ph.D. is a
German academic degree. But despite the alleged respect
that the Briton and American give to the possessor of
abstruse factual knowledge, new ways of science have
characterized the twentieth century. The Nazis, coldly
and with calculation, killed science, exiling and destroying learned men. The result has been the end of an
era and the Germans today seem to be suffering the
birth pangs of a new intellectualism.
The German Arts

The development of Germany as a marginal culture
is perhaps best attested in the growth of literature. It is

Journal of, Volume Thirty-two, No. 3, 1965

also examplified, however, in related arts, such as art,
architecture, and music. These aspects are not wholly
organically connected, either in time or space, but it is
possible to detect one dominant chord that runs through
the whole of German creative expression. Romanticism
and all that it implies is essentially a German growth.
It is taken in stride by the artistic creativity of other nations and incorporated into existing patterns, but the Germans themselves, however, agonize and suffer over it.
The trend, while true of all the German arts, is best
exemplified in literature, interpreted in its broadest sense
to include drama as well as the lyric and prose (Kroeber,
1944:292-297; 369-375; 440-442; 548-559; 637-643).
Evert if the medieval periods with their extremely
rich literary contributions be omitted, it is a long road
from Sebastian Brant's Narrenschifj to Thomas Mann's
unfinished Felix Krull. The literature of the last four
hundred years begins with one satire and ends with
another, the latter symbolically incomplete. In between,
the pendulum seems to swing widely from nature to
nationalism only to come again to a dead stop. And
let it be quickly said that the other arts follow suit. In
German literature there is a strong beat. The Middle
Ages and the German humanists reflect this strength, not
only in the earlier epic and Minnesang, that German
expression of the Troubadour Era, but in the vigor of
the literature of folk and land, from the Meier Helmbrecht to Tyl Eulenspiegel and the amusing creations of
Hanns Sachs. As with thought and science, these early
phases are European and medieval, essentially cosmopolitan and, even if German oriented, not yet symptomatic of the internalizing of the German spirit. Richness
ends again after the Reformation, when austerity arises
and when there is a growing indifference to the Renaissance rediscovery of the Classical (Rossler, 1955: 146166 passim) .
Thus one can give little attention to German literature
in the period roughly dated 1550-1750. There are writers
and names, to be sure, but scrutiny of them is reserved
for the specialist. The seventeenth century attempt to
find the Renaissance was abortive. Martin Opitz (15971639), for example, might have done well in France of
his day, where the classic pulse out of Italy was beginning to be felt, but as it is he must be seen as a German
anachronism.
It is the eighteenth century and indeed, the latter half
of it, when the Germans begin to feel the Renaissance
mode and struggle with it in a way that is peculiarly
German. Lessing and Goethe, it has been said, to a degree, Schiller, and somewhat later, Heine, were not
German in their total grasp of human problems, in their
successful cosmopolitanism, and in their universalist attitudes. But it must be considered that Lessing's Laokoon
set a neoclassic tone and that the Sturm und Drang period brought classicism and romanticism together in a
distinctive way, a specifically German way. Schiller,
apostle of human liberty, dealt with German themes,
while Heine was the prophet without honor precisely
because he did not. However eclectic, however universalist the eighteenth century period of German litera175

ture was in its beginnings, the tone that it set moved off
tangentially to something wholly German. It kept pace
with the Kantian-Hegelian drive toward German Kultur.
For here again a familiar pattern is discernible. German
literature, late in its beginnings, chooses widely from the
archtypes of Europe and is impressed with the intellectual trends of pan-Europe. These coalesce on German soil in such a way as to be integrated meaningfully
in the German context and to create a pattern of Germanicness. One need only compare, for example, the
first part of Goethe's Faust with the second, the initial
drama the work of a young, vigorous, and buoyant mind,
the creation of universalism, even if Germantoned,
while Faust, Part II possesses all the recondite symbolism
that an aging German mystic could bring forth.
The beginnings of the eighteenth-century period of
greatness date at 1758, with the publication of Klopstock's Messias. Goethe died in 1832. Between these
two dates is the initial pulse, the beginning and clustering of an extensive and imposing list of creative minds.
But the cycle does not wholly end with the passing of
Goethe; it goes into a series of epigonal phases. There
is a gradual transition through the nineteenth to the
twentieth century. German letters continue to flourish
up to modern times or, at least, until the advent of
World War I and the period of National Socialism thereafter. The growth of German literature corresponds fairly
closely to that in both philosophy and science; 1800 saw
something of a peak or climax and the nineteenth century a gradual trend downwards. This is not to decry the
near modern period. It is simply to say that through
the bulk of the nineteenth century there was greatness
but no genius. Heine is a great lyricist but no one
would rank him above Goethe in this achievement and,
certainly, the later German lyricists fall well below Heine
in universal esteem. There is a marked parallel in philosophy: Nietzsche is interesting but he is not the creator
that Kant, Fichte, Hegel, or even Schopenhauer, were.
Greatness, it seems, constellates and the Germans provide lucidly discernible constellations. Literary greatness in Germany lay in the peculiar and distinctive resolution of the problem of classicism and romanticism,
not only because of the intensity of the response to their
discovery. Just as in philosophy the mode of expression
and the dominant theme were channeled by Kant, so
also in literature and allied arts romanticism set the
tone. The nineteenth century saw its problem solved and
no reason to deviate from the existing solution.
Literature best exemplifies the two points of culture
process operative in the building of German character
and culture. The first is lateness and a sudden period of
greatness. Klopstock, Lessing, Wieland, Herder, Goethe,
Schiller, the Schlegels, Tieck, Uhland, Grillparzer names picked at random - characterize the beginning.
As Kroeber points out, all these were born within a
65-year period, and theirs is the age of greatest energy
and productivity, reflecting a sudden upsurge essentially
without antecedents. Heine follows, and from him it is
possible to move into the constellations of the nineteenth century German writers, interesting but lesser
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men who combine romantic idealism with V aterland and
Kultur. And this. as may be seen in the case of Wagner,
Nietzsche, and many others, can have dire results. But
these latter-day themes suggest the second point of
culture process. This is intensity, depth, and the displacement of energy. Whatever else may be said about
German literature, it must be taken seriously. Sentimental, mystical, brutal, brooding, withal highly romantic, it does far more than tell a tale.
The integration of European literary ideals in a specifically German way necessitates corning to grips with the
romantic ideal. France, it can be suggested, is dealing
successfully with Renaissance classic modes by 1650,
England a trifle later, while Germany, despite the aspirations of Opitz, is obliged to wait yet another century. But when classicism reaches Germany, there is a
virtual explosion, a concatenation of the classic spirit,
naturalism, and convention wrestling with innovation.
The result is a German brand of romanticism, earlier,
it is true, than the movement operating in England and
France. Sturm und Drang is definable in terms of culture process as the late arrival of influences brought together hurriedly, excitedly, and in an essentially uncrystallized way. Shakespeare, Rousseau, and the Greek
tragedians are strong meat; when taken together, there
is reaping of the whirlwind. Lessing's Loakoon marks
the start of the struggle; his Minna von Barnhelm and
Emilia Galotti accentuate it. Goethe's own ambivalence
to mode and style lies in the contrast between Gatz von
Berlichingen and the lphigenie auf Tauris. Here the nationalist prose drama is pitted against the pseudo-classic
Greek style, the latter a psychological play, in hexameters, and one that drops the deus ex machina in favor of
naturalism. German romanticism is thus not wholly a
repudiation. Classic strains persist in style and theme
and, as with other aspects of German total culture, are
brought to an intense and skewed culmination.
Lessing's Laokoon essays analysis of the relations between the poetic and the plastic in art. Motivated by the
discovery of the Laokoon sculpture, Lessing is struck
by the fact that the Trojan priest and his sons, strangling
in the serpentine coils, show anguish but not frenzy.
On the other hand, Vergil, in describing Minerva's vengeance in the Aeneid, stresses the frenzied agony of the
serpents' victims. Lessing's basic question relates to the
problem of naturalistic expression in art and poetry.
He resolves it by the dictum, " ... dass die Poesie eine
redende Malerei, die Malerei eine stumme Poesie sei."
The influence of Lessing on romantic growth among the
Germans is clearly defined. While the plastic arts did
not keep pace, definitely lagging behind in both greatness and intensity in the period in question, it is this
rationale that underlies the Gotz and it is the same spirit
that evokes the agonies of Werther. Germany's literary
greatness lies directly in the abrupt transition from classic
modes coupled with romanticism through Sturm und
Drang to an ultimate of romantic expression. In its beginning, this was something characteristically German,
so much so, in fact, that the process of culture building
now operates in reverse, France and Britain being the
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laggards. Macpherson's Ossian had its German part to
play, Goethe admired Byron, but it was a long time before Scott and Carlyle discovered the German romanticists. Werther accompanied the conqueror Napoleon
I on his campaigns and on reading it, countless young
men in Europe blew. out their brains. This product of
Sturm und Drang, Lessing's creation, culminating in the
intensity of the romantic ideal, remain as the hallmark of
German culture.
German music parallels literature most felicitously,
both in its upsurge and in its later romantic configurations. A late medieval impulse, derived from Italy, but
also from the Netherlands, and again, both the polyphonic movement and the Lutheran chorales of the sixteenth century suggest the parallels in other developments for the same period. German opera comes in with
Schiiltz (1585-1672), but there is otherwise a fairly
sterile period until the rise of Bach. Music thus slightly
antedates literature in its culminations. While Bach must
be regarded as something more than a product of his
age and place. The wohltemperierte Klavier of 1722-25
is a major development, establishing as it does the pattern for the music of the West through the next two
centuries. The great period lies between 1725 and 1828,
with the death of Schubert, between these dates falling
Bach, Handel, Gliick, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Weber, and Schubert. This classic period parallels significantly the developments in literature and philosophy,
especially when it is remembered that Beethoven had
composed eight of his nine symphonies before 1812.
The post-classic period, with Mendelssohn, Schumann,
Wagner, Offenbach, Johann Strauss, and Brahms, not
to mention the Hungarian, Liszt, and many others, is
somewhat more difficult to characterize. The transition
away from controlled forms and into a deep and complex emotional realm obviously requires wholly subjective evaluation. One can think, however, of Richard
Strauss, and Thomas Mann as latter-day revivalists of
German classicism, even if Beethoven and Goethe loom
significantly above them.
Romanticism in literature and music, characterizing
the nineteenth century, passes to France on the one hand
and to Russia on the other. Both in the novel and in
musical forms especially, Germany begins to lag. This
is perhaps less apparent through the midqle decades of
the nineteenth century but obvious by the beginning of
the twentieth. With the death of Brahms there remains
Richard Strauss, and Mann, too, seems to stand alone.
In other facets of artistic endeavor, the Germans have
been less well recognized. In painting, sculpture, and
architecture they are pretty well overshadowed by their
counterparts in other nations. Kroeber analyzes the
temporal and sequential development and for the first
time, the pattern fails to be consistent. The classic period of Germany from, one may say, 1775-1825, is not
one of greatness in the plastic arts. There were German
romantic painters but the great impulse of the classic
period is lacking; Germany produces no artists worthy
of the name. Here again is the marginal culture. Not
only is Germany out of step with the rest of Europe,
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but its facets do not keep pace with each other. Music
offers the longest period, art virtually none. The development is inconsistent, although there is one early period
of German artistic growth, one that ties in with the
developments of the early sixteenth century. Holbein
and Diirer can be equated with the phenomenal burgeoning of art that characterized the Netherlands and Italy
of that day. But Germany's greatness lies not so much
in the age of Luther as it does in the age of Kant and
Goethe. The lack of consistent internal development
spells out marginality, the fact that the Germans chose
to be selective and steeped themselves deeply in the
things that their culture came to emphasize. Fine craftsmen they were and are, but their technology is imitative
and lacks profoundness. It appears that the German
preoccupation with self-determinism and destiny, with
the theoretic component, has ruled out a balance with
the aesthetic component. Music may be an exception to
this, although, be it remembered, German greatness in
this area is one of form. Art and architecture, however,
even if, at an early period, the Gothic styles represent
German perfectionism, clearly are no such exception.
Summary:

It should not be forgotten that the foregoing review,
subjectively selective though it must be, has as its aim
the demonstration of Germany as a marginal culture.
In line .with these various aspects of German growth,
developments late in time and essentially out of keeping
with discernible patterns elsewhere in the continuum of
Western European culture, the behavioral vagaries and
excesses associated with imperfect sociocultural integration should be anticipated. The implications of this for
contemporary behavior are to be considered presently.
For the moment, however, suffice it to remark that of
the German periods of ascendancy, two main ones appear. The first has been equated with the Reformation,
an era in which a general constellation of social change
and originality and inventiveness can be outlined. This, as
has been suggested, is a German constellation but one
that owes much of its being to the general humanism
and cosmopolitanism that characterized Europe of the
day. It was the time of the universities, of the growth of
trade, a time of political and social unrest when general currents swept back and forth across Europe. Hence,
the earlier culminations of literature, music, philosophy,
art, and science are as much pan-European as they are
German. This is not to deny that the seeds of German
social structure and German culture had been sown.
Luther's concept of family, his view on authority, his
general ideology, in fact, is sufficiently indicative of this.
The beginnings of nationalism and the rise of local in~
terest put the Germans in a difficult position. This, more
than the specific event, the struggles of the Thirty Years'
War or the slow decay of the Holy Roman Empire itself, shoved Germany into a European back seat.
Generally, the sixteenth century in its latter half, as
well as the whole seventeenth century, are times of
stagnation for the Germans. England, France, and
Spain were carving out world dominion, even the Por177

tuguese and the Dutch were struggling in the international arena. Germany, lacking political unity, land
rather than sea oriented, was removed from the stage.
The Germans hung behind, uncertain of their position,
confused concerning their place as a nation and their
culture. The age .of Elizabeth I, Cromwell, Francis I
and Louis XIV, was not duplicated in Germany. The
result is that the Germans proceed slowly and with
caution. Conversely, they avidly seize on new ideas, do
not experiment with them, and cling tightly to what
they have gained. How well this borne out can be seen
by the tremendously long periods of ascendancy of
various cultural aspects, the long periods of music, from
1725, of literature, from 1748, of philosophy, from
1797, and of science, from 1800. Painting, sculpture, and
architecture they never really discovered, although had
they done so, it seems safe to surmise that these too
would have followed a like pattern.
There can be no question of German ingenuity. The
intellectual, suddenly aware of numerous traditions
emerging from many sides, responds with the invention
of the romantic movement, earlier in Germany than
elsewhere. But the later development was an unfortunate
one. The integration of the romantic movement came to
mean the idealization of Kultur and the identification of
Kultur with nation. As idea and ideal, German Kultur
forced the nationalistic spirit, promoted national unity
under Bismarck far more effectively than it could in
its nascent period under Frederick the Great. The demand for colonies and Lebensraum, pseudo-scientific
geopolitical and racist theories, as well as a distorted
view of historical determinism and destiny are patterns
developed by Germans as part of a national and marginal
self-consciousness. Kroeber's review of the German
growth is to the point:
. . . their strange anticipations must not be overlooked; the Othonian sculpture and architecture,
the poets Wolfram and Walther a century before
Dante, the first science in Europe, printing, the
Reformation. Germans simply have not moved in
accordance with a generic European pattern. Early
and thoroughly original in spots, they have nevertheless done much imitating, have often proceded
confusedly, and have been retarded in growing to
full civilization maturity (Kroeber, 1944: 715).
This is the price that the Germans have paid for
marginality- self-glorification in Kultur, suspicion and
hostility against the outside - and yet with a sense of
destiny and a shaping of destiny through will.
It remains for such cultures as theirs to assume the
burdens of humanity, to view their own achievements
with an inordinate seriousness and earnestness, and to
concern themselves deeply with outward form. Japan
and Russia have followed a similar course, accepting innovation, but remaining essentially uninventive. The
new forms of culture that they adopt sit upon them
lightly and imperfectly. Yet their mission to remake the
world and to assume leadership in the world as an integral part of their own conception of manifest destiny
reflects their basic uncertainty, their unwilling depend178

ence on firmer, better integrated, and more centrally located cultures.
A recent theory regarding the nature of culture holds
that advances are made through the control and output
of energy (White, 1949:363-393; Hoebel, 1956, Childe,
1951:180-188). Throughout the previous sections, the
comment has been frequently made that the Germans are
characterized by an outpouring of force, a factor that
makes for some of the more deeply rooted and intense
developments in their culture. Any theory of this kind
implies an inevitable ideal of progress, not necessarily
in unilineal terms, such as, for example, Marxism would
profess, but at least a continuing multilineal growth. The
German culture, again like the Japanese and the Russian,
and many other marginal growths, suggests intensity and
the outpouring of free energy. But as long as Germany
and its history can be viewed as ancillary to the central
growths of Europe, the only possible conclusion is that
German culture, proceeding in spurts and sctarts, uncertain, confused, has been unable to harness the forces of
energy generated by its very nature.
And the end is not in sight. If the lessons of culture
history are at all to be taken seriously, the Germans are
no different in the contemporary world setting. Buoyed
up by economic supports, bolstered by their own sense
of goal and the striving to achieve it, which again seems
so vital a part of the marginal consequence-flurried activity, translatable perhaps as Tilchtigkeit, being little
more than a hurried effort to "catch up," the result of a
national inferiority complex-the modem Germans repeat
a pattern. In a federal union of Europe, assuming such
might one day come about, the culture center could conceivably shift to Germany and the consequent pace become more measured. Throughout German culture history, no less today, the pattern of lateness and imbalance
is discernible. One can echo Grillparzer and say of the
whole of German culture and its components-"Es kam
zu spat," and the results are the incertitudes allemandes.
The German Family - Authoritarian Ideal?

One question of importance remains. Intellectual currents are not necessarily popular currents, even if, in a
balanced and well integrated culture there is seemingly
a higher degree of participation by the mass. But many
factors in German society would preclude such sharing
- class structuring and the educational system among
them. Hence, the problem remains of how the German
citizen, the inhabitant of town and country, is affected by
the culture processes described here. The individual in
any culture is not critical of the premises on which his
life is founded. How many Protestant Americans, indeed,
could explain the doctrine of original sin? Similarly, how
many Germans could expatiate on the nature of authority
or freedom of the will? Very few, of course, but here are
principles and postulates that play an extremely significant role in the life of that individual. Moving away,
then, from the great themes of German culture, the
forces that the Germans have unleashed and the mark
that they have made on the pages of world and Western
civilization, it seems important to consider the effects of
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the culture-historic process on daily life. Marginality still
has a place, as analysis of the institution of the family
shows.
Since 1945, the years that have seen the formidable
power of the Soviet Union, the exigencies of the cold
war, and the shifts of power in Europe, Germany has
come to have more and more of a place. There was an
ostensible expiation in the war crimes trials, even if many
Germans of today retain, in keeping with their extremist
cultural ideals, an oppressive sense of guilt. But the
world seems to breathe more easily now that Goebbels'
philosophy is no longer overt and the personalities connected with the National-Socialist movement are dead,
imprisoned, or released as having paid a debt to world
society. The fangs are drawn, presumably, and the free
world is willing to accept the Germans as a potential ally.
There is no quarrel with the ideal of war guilt even if, as
seems evident, effects were being treated as causes, and,
certainly, no attempt is made here to cast moral aspersions on the Germans. They are what their culture has
made them and it is doubtful that the process of history
· can be reversed in a few short years. But, if the Germans
are to be the ally of the free world and to stand as something of a bulwark against the Hegelian-Marxian notions
that the Germans themselves brought into being, it has
seemed necessary to understand, to find causes for German behavior. The view has been that if German behavior could be predicted, if there could be more adequate
comprehension of the German value system, and if the
German personality could be more systematically delineated, it might be considerably easier to share a world
with the Germans.
These questions of behavior, personality, and values
have been so pressing that every attempt has been made
to find a quick and ready answer to them. A contemporary solution has been found in the tools provided by
psychiatry, in the attempt to elicit for the Germans, or in
fact, for any and all national cultures, the modal personality, the construct individual who might, given various
socializing institutions in the culture, be expected to
emerge. The thesis has been explicitly put forward that
personality is derivative of sociocultural forms and, in
turn, by operating in a climate favorable to itself perpetuates such sociocultural institutions. This circular interpretation seems logical and plausible, even if, with the
possible exception of Erich Fromm, the psychiatrically
oriented critic ignores history. A commonly held contemporary view is that Germany is an authoritarian culture, one bound to the image of the stern father who arbitrarily and capriciously directs, controls, rewards, and
punishes. Freud, many have held, could not have expounded his Oedipal reasoning so lucidly if he had lived
in a cultural setting where the father-child relationship
was not so fraught with tension. The stage is apparently
set by Freud, since the personality constellation of the
Germans has been most frequently analyzed in terms of
depth psychology. Abrahamson, for example, explains
the Nazi tyranny in terms of personality derived from
family and familial relationships. Adolph Hitler, he notes,
became the symbol of paternal supremacy and the Ger-
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mans readily gave in to the culturally comprehensible
(Abrahamson, 1945:27ff.).
Two points are thus suggested that presumably shed
light on the German national character of today. Personality and family, it has been argued, bound together inextricably, interact to produce the stern authoritarian
ethos of the Germans. Interaction there unquestionably
is, but the equation is considerably oversimplified.
Neither family nor personality can exist outside the community of understandings that has been defined as culture. There is a German value system, or better, a German culture, in which values play a vital part. The German emphasis on Kultur, moral and spiritual supremacy,
the kinds of interpersonal relationships that the Germans
have established--'.in short, the peculiar and idiosyncratic
definitions that the Germans have developed against the
background of Western civilization-suggest a need for a
considerably broader approach than one based on concern with individual social institutions or modes of personality. The family and the individual are also parts of
the cultural whole.
Family, and its concomitant, personality, are historically derived. Like other aspects and facets of culture,
these cannot be perceived out of context from the total
fabric. Where consideration has been given in the previous sections to the products of culture in an historical
matrix and in terms of function, society and its associated institutions can be subjected to the same yardstick.
The German family is a growth that also reflects the
processes of culture building. Much the same forces have
been operative as in the rest of Europe; clearly, the Germans do not differ in their organization from the British
or French, or even the Americans. But the constellation
is slightly different. A social skewing takes place that is
suggestive and that, in turn, may have implications for
the development of a construct individual different from
the average in another nation. If the German culture is
marginal, what effect does this marginality have on the
growth of social institutions and thereafter, on behavior?
Character, reflected in behavior, is derived from the
processes of learning. In this sense, the family becomes ,
a fundamental institution in any society, having as its
primary function education and socialization, the making
of the individual and the creation of harmony between
him and the society at large.
The problem of defining the German family is admittedly difficult. How does this institution differ from that
in France, England, or even, if one moves south, to Italy
and Spain, or eastward, to the Slavic areas, is there a
significant departure? It would seem, on the contrary,
that the German family structure is wholly like that of
much of the rest of Europe. To an American, in fact, the
German family as structure seems wholly comprehensible and predictable. There is monogamy, essential permanence of the marital tie, the parents emerging as primary in the care and management of the young, and a
general extension of kinship to relatives of various kinds.
Grandparents, brothers and sisters of the parents, cousins to various degrees are variously reckoned by the individual nuclear family, both within •and outside the
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household. It is a simple picture, one not complicated by
the notions of collective responsibility that seem to motivate the southern Italians or the Sicilians or by any particularistic variation in organization. In other words, the
German family resembles, on the surface, at least, that
of Western Europe generally, and ideally, too, that of the
United States.
The difference between the German family and that of
the rest of Europe thus seems to be one of shading and
emphasis. It is clearly a difference of degree and not of
kind. A strong patriarchal tone characterized the Germanic tribes of Tacitus' time, but this was in no way out
of joint with the gentile system of the Romans. Historically, Germany shares its familial institution with the rest
of Europe and begins to differ from its national neighbors
only when the exigencies of history force the Germans to
a conservative retention of patterns that other national
cultures could more freely permit to change. "Patriarchal" is the adjective usually applied to the German
family, but it must be noted that instances of strong
paternalistic institutions can readily be found elsewhere
in Europe. This being so, the question of whether one is
confronted by a stereotype or whether the Germans actually move further in the direction of strong patriarchalism than other Europeans must remain.
Complexity arises in delimiting the German family in
the face of regional, urban-rural, and class differences. A
great deal has been written about the family in Germany,
both from the point of view of these differences and in
terms of the changes that are taking place in the troubled
times of modern industrialism ( Schelsky, 19 5 4: 17-26) .
A visitor to modern West Germany, however casual his
stay, is struck at once by the presence of the so-called
"Halbstarken," the groups of sometimes vicious adolescents who arise as a disturbing social problem in virtually
every city and town. The East Zone is, if anything, more
subject to these excesses of juvenile gangs. Does this one
symptom mean that the German family is in a state of
decay, that the strong familial bonds that characterized
the last century are now less effective? To a certain extent, it probably does, since familial disruption in the
modern setting of industrialized individualism is seemingly taking place less gradually and later among the
Germans. The result is that the associated problems seem
all the more cogent. Further, since conservatism and observance of outward form seem to have keynoted the
German family until relatively recently, the storm and
stress of change is all the more acute. Probably, too, the
Nazi glorification of the state at the expense of the family
· is having its latter-day effect. But to say that the modern
familial institution is suffering some disorganization is to
imply that there is a consistent thread running through
German society, a family theme that permits definition
and is distinctive. Despite the differences of locality and
class, it does seem defensible that the German family
possesses certain kinds of attributes that can be analyzed.
Forgetting the disruption of the present, or, at least, the
symptoms of change to which German sociologists are
calling attention, and omitting, too, the local and particularistic differences, one can say that there is a family
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ideal, a goal to be attained, and a convention that is
familiar to all participants in the culture. Rarely, in any
culture, can an individual meet the ideal, but invariably,
he possesses an awareness of it. Hence, the family, in its
idealized form, can be looked at not so much as an element in the structure of society as in its reflection of culture.
But even if a family system, idealized in German culture, is discussed, paradox again intrudes. The question
has been fully explored by Lowie in his analyses of German family types. He calls attention to the tremendous
contrast between the idyllic family situation of the Germans, rapturously described as the ultimate in human
warmth and love by any number of German nationalists
and Teutonophiles, and the strongly authoritarian family,
ugly and distasteful to the outsider, in which the tyrannical father is master, arbitrarily bending wife and children
to his will (Lowie, 1954: 197-262). The Kultur ideal
led such writers as Karl Immermann (1796-1840) to
eulogize the German family and look with some disdain at the parallel institution in France and Britain.
While there are commendable traits, Immermann maintains, neither the French nor the English family can offer the warmth and harmony and sanctity of love that
radiates from mother to child and pervades the German
home. Modern times have seen this idealistic view carried into Nazi propaganda, where, despite practice to
the contrary, the glorification of the German family
was used as a point of argument for German moral superiority. Conversely, a modern psychiatrist, such as
Schaffner, returns to the authoritarian figure of the father in order to explain Nazism (Schaffner, 1948).
Certainly, a stereotype of the German family is widely
held. A fairly common image is that of Luther's comments on his own childhood.
My parents treated me very severely; so much so
that I became timid and withdrawn (gar schiichtern). My mother once beat me so that the blood
flowed because I had taken a worthless nut; her
severity and the strictness of the ·life she made me
lead had the effect of driving me into a monastery
(Buchwald, 1947:1-2).
But elsewhere, Luther justifies his mother's action and
goes on to praise the strict parent. His Christian family
ideal, in fact, suggests both points of view: the loving
family circle in which the parents, the father especially,
become wholly dominant.
Luther's epitome of the German family indicates that
neither the romantic idealization of it nor the wholly
vicious tyranny by a father figure can be held as a true
conception. One finds both, of course, as Lowie's careful
researches indicate. There is, on the one hand, the happy
family life of the eminent historian, Theodor Mommsen,
a truly ideal picture, with its close and intimate human
relations. On the other hand, there is the biography of
the workingman, Karl Fischer, collected by Gohre,
whose reminiscences spell out the father's sadism and
pointless cruelty. Lowie is unquestionably correct in finding that each extreme is rare and that the family structure of the Germans falls generally somewhere between.
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One might add further that the absolute limits on either
end of the scale are no more than variations on the major
theme of_ German familism. As Lowie notes, whether
there is a panegyric or an indictment, there is still agreement on the authoritarian focus.
In the modern and near modern economic system,
omitting from consideration the fact that more extensive
employment of women may undoubtedly have a modifying effect, the balance of roles between family members
was fairly constant and predictable. The male as provider, the woman as household manager, is a picture applicable to Europe at large. The change comes not so
much with urban-rural differentiation in modern times as·
it does with industrialization. Admittedly, the German
family has changed as a result, as has the family structure
in other nations of the west. With respect to this point,
Lowie carefully reminds one of the fact that in Europe,
in general, there was for centuries a strong patriarchalism, a situation of social and legal dominance for males
and of subordination of both women and children. If this
point is remembered, it is somewhat difficult to see the
causal connection between German familism as such and
the rise of the dominant political personality such as a
Bismarck or a Hitler. Lowie asks, quite legitimately, why
does not the patriarchalism of France, and it is clearly
there, also produce a ruthless dictator (Lowie, 1945:
251-252)?
One is left with the conclusion that it is not primarily
a question of structure that arises when the German family comes to the fore, but again, one of culture. In other
words, the structure of the German family looks like that
of the rest of Western Europe, but when the relations of
that family system to the total array of understandings
characteristic of Germany are considered, a difference is
noted. The same extremism that can be seen in German
historical development generally, in thought, science, or
literature, is also observable in the family. It has been
said that the familism of Germany represents conservatism. If this means that the Germans have held more
tightly to the bonds of family, that they have invested the
institution with a preciseness of definition of social role,
the description is a fitting one. This is the marginal consequence repeated. Insecurity and uncertainty lead to
precision of form and adherence to fixed pattern. In one
sense, the German family reflects a survival of the past;
in another, it suggests the virtual compulsion to avoid
responsibility-improvement, perhaps, but not invention.
The German cultural insecurity is translated into the
family in that out of the submissive child comes the authoritarian parent. Thrust into the dominant role, the individual lacks preparation; if he succeeds, the family
takes on the idyllic tone; if he fails, he becomes the
brutal master. The insecure tyrant is a personality type
discussed at length by psychiatry. From the family to
personality is an easy step and it is possible to find the
same extremes of sensitivity and brutality in this area.
It is not difficult to understand how the processes that
shaped the total culture of the Germans have also had
their affect in the rise of the family system. The problem
that the Germans faced in respect to the concept of freeJournal of, Volume Thirty-two, No. 3, 1965

dom applies as much to the family as it does to political
institutions. The Germans, regardless of religious orientation, have accepted the Lutheran premise that man is
fundamentally evil, "blind, dead, and an enemy of God."
The acceptance of God as a free act, the subordination
of self willingly to authority, have their repercussions in
the Kantian formulation. This, a rational explanation for
a covert cultural premise, explains the concept of Schichtung, the paradox of hierarchial ordering against freedom
of will.
It is in this area and in this paradox that the German
family possesses its distinctiveness. The virtually intranslatable concepts that the Germans utilize to express the
gamut of relational attitudes reflect the patterning. Ehrfurcht, for example, conceptually keynotes the interpersonal relations within the family. Far more than respect,
although inclusive of it, the term implies the proper emotional balance between parent and child, the honorable
submission to the will of the parent by an act of one's
own will. And by extension, one accords Ehrfurcht to all
authority. It would be incorrect to imply docility or
meekness in the concept of Ehrfurcht; it is, instead, a
positive, inspired feeling, one brought about by the sense
of what is fitting, proper, and honorable (hence, Ehre)
in human relationships. Similarly, the noun Demut, implying much more than humility, is the positive act of
submission to parents, God and Church, and to constituted authority.
Thus, it would be rank error to follow the reasoning
that makes of the German a robot product of his social
structure. The notion of "honor," not unlike a somewhat
more familiar one that occurs particularly in the British
setting, implies a quest and a choice, indeed, a dilemma
at times, as Sudermann's drama, Fritzchen, so poignantly
shows. Here, the hero, having been caught in a compromising situation with the wife of a brother officer, faces
a duel. His guilt is clear and his death a certainty. His
problem arises in the delicate situation of explaining his
action to his father and of balancing personal and family
honor. It is a play-one of many dealing with a type situation-that can have little meaning outside of a Prussian
military context, but it succeeds admirably in illustrating
the Faustian antithesis of destiny and will that affect a
family circumstance.
It is this kind of example that sheds light, not so much
on the formal structure of the German family and the
circle of interpersonal relationships operative within it,
as it does on the values that lie hidden in both family
and personality and that create the climate in which both
can be effective. Is the German family an authoritarian
institution? It is indeed, given the cultural premises of
the Germans. It seems, too, that the Germans have
chosen to stress this feature somewhat longer and to accord it a greater patterned and institutionalized emphasis
than has been true of other western national cultures. In
German culture there is the happy family, the Christmas
and birthday party, the biirgerliche V ater, honorable,
strict, yet jovial, predictable and consistent to the children who sit at his board. Conversely, there is Luther's
mother and the sadistic father of Frederick the Great.
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Max und Moritz, Struwwelpeter, and the intense and
oversensitive revolufa:mary lie somewhere between. For
all its human warmth, for all the closeness of human ties
that the marginal culture of Germany has in fact begotten, the channels and directions are clear. There is still
a certain distance between family members. Certain
things have not come about; there is no German Dombey
and Son.
lhe present study began with Kant, was influenced
by' him, and in the end, it seems fitting to return to his
analysis of German character. It is acceptable. The
"why" of German behavior, perhaps, can be arrived at
by different means. When, in history, things passed Germany by, when event and invention, drama and cataclysm were taking place elsewhere, a course was set for
German growth. Uncertain, lacking unity, content to wait
until virtually too late, the Germans coped with innovation only with travail. Is there a German mentality?
Cheering though a shorthand psychological analysis
might be, a German mind can only be found in the
complexities of the totality of values and behavior, artifact and social structure, that make up the ethos that is
German. And this is a product of history. As the course
of history changes, so also may German culture, and with
German culture, so also German destiny.
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